Blayne Haggart's Orangespace

Includes a nostalgic look back to the times when Sidewalk Labs promised us a community built “from the internet up.”

Previous Master Innovation and Development Plan liveblog entries and relevant documents available here

Onward, into Part 1.

Part 1: Neighbourhood Planning Concepts (pp. 292-348)

Lots of repetition from things mentioned in the Quayside chapter and the Overview.

Part 1.1: The River District Program (pp. 294-302)

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Full-page photos comprise half of Part 1.1’s eight pages.

Neighbourhood production

New production and workshop facilities, enabled by Sidewalk Labs’ unique lower-floor stoa spaces, can be located throughout the district, strengthening the commitment to a diversity of uses and providing additional opportunities for small businesses that build off new technologies and capabilities. (p. 295)

the ability to live and work in the same neighbourhood (p. 296)

Question: What specific bylaws changes would this plan require? Here, we’re just being sold on the benefits, not the – what’s the word – planning required to actually do it.

And, yes, some of this information is provided (or will probably be provided) elsewhere in the report, but why not include all the relevant information in one section?

Part 1.2: Villiers West: Creating an Economic Hub With a Thriving New (pp. 303-313; not listed in Table of Contents)

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Eleven pages, three full-page photos, three-quarters of one page taken up with a pull quote.

Urban innovation: it’s not just tech; it’s political

This effort defines urban innovation as going beyond the mere pursuit of urban efficiencies associated with the “smart cities” movement, towards a broader set of digital, physical, and policy advances that enable government agencies, academics, civic institutions, and entrepreneurs both local and global to address large urban challenges. (p. 304)

This quote highlights the extent to which Sidewalk Labs and Google are not just, or maybe even primarily, interested in creating new technologies. Rather, they are interested in the policies and politics that shape technology. This makes sense, because technology reflects the society that produces it. What’s more, just as different people have different views of how society should be structured and what government should do, so too are there different views about what technologies should be developed, how they should be used, and to what ends.

In other words, technology is highly political. This proposal shows that Google isn’t interested in reacting to these social imperatives and constraints; it wants to shape them so as to favour its own particular interests. This is what this Urban Innovation Institute is about.

Most importantly, Google’s interests may not align with those of Torontonians or Canada. This is something that we should be discussing publicly, in City Council, in the Ontario Legislature, and in Parliament. They’re also conversations that academics need to be having, including the extent to which private-sector (particularly Google and the other big US tech companies) research financing is shaping our participation in these debates.

As it stands, these plans are another example of how Sidewalk Labs’ seemingly benign proposals, in this case for an Urban innovation Institute (p. 306) and having Google anchor and “catalyze” (p. 306) the Toronto tech sector, would pre-empt vital and necessary policy conversations.

Quick note on Urban Innovation Institute governance: Sidewalk Labs is committing to $10 million in seed funding, which would be administered by an “agreed-upon” entity. (p. 307)

Part 1.3: Beyond Villiers West: A Different Role for Sidewalk Labs (pp. 314-315; not listed in Table of Contents)

Two pages outlining/repeating how Sidewalk Labs sees its role in the wider waterfront (discussed in the previous post covering the River District Introduction).

Part 1.4: Vision for Villiers East: Achieving Key Public Policy Goals (pp. 316-329; not listed in Table of Contents)

Part 1.5: Vision for Keating Channel: Reclaiming a Historic Canal (pp. 330-335; not listed in Table of Contents)

Part 1.6: Vision for McCleary: Creating a Model Live-Work Neighbourhood (pp. 336-341; not listed in Table of Contents)

Part 1.7: Vision for Polson Quay: Reinventing a Working Waterfront Neighbourhood (pp. 342-347; not listed in Table of Contents)

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Forty-two pages. Nine full-page illustrations. Three full-page pull-quotes.

And that’s not counting all the maps and artists’ renderings of communities (e.g., p. 325).

Key points

Again, this section generally repeats what we’ve already read; it’s basically the Quayside plan rolled out to its desired parts of the Eastern Waterfront, with some site-specific proposals a lot of “could-ing”. Here’s what may stand recalling.

On governance:

• Sidewalk Labs would be involved in developing “an ‘Infrastructure and Transportation Master Plan’ that sets the guidelines for the types of systems required and identifies and supports pathways to implementation. (p. 320)
• “At Villiers Island, both west and east, Sidewalk Labs would work with Waterfront Toronto to identify and establish specifications and a path to implementation for each infrastructure system. These systems include … Thermal grid … Advanced power grid … Active stormwater management … Freight delivery … Ubiquitous connectivity … Additional systems … such as water and sanitary sewer connections … Ongoing exploration [to develop] advanced infrastructure systems …” (p. 322)

More tomorrow.

Same volume (one), but new chapter (2). Progress!

In which I wonder exactly how deep Google’s pockets actually are.

Previous Master Innovation and Development Plan liveblog entries and relevant documents available here

Introduction (pp. 256-291)

Here, Sidewalk Labs attempts to move the goalposts of the RFP from a Quayside project with possible extensions into the wider Eastern Waterfront to an Eastern Waterfront project (relabeled the IDEA District) of which Quayside is an integral part. It’s a deft, if long-winded sleight of hand.

And of course, Sidewalk Labs hasn’t bothered to list the subsections of each sections in the Table of Contents. Also, there is no overarching (four-volume) Table of Contents.

Just in case you’ve lost track, here’s the land under discussion (map on page 259):

• The IDEA District consists of the “River District” and Quayside.
• The “River District” consists of the IDEA District minus Quayside. It includes Villiers Island, McCleary, Polson Quay, and part of the Keating Channel Precinct.
• Sidewalk Labs wants to divide Villiers Island into Villiers East and Villiers West, taking Villiers West for Google’s Canadian branch headquarters.
• It also divides the Keating Channel Precinct into East and West, claiming “Keating East” for this project.

Much of the introduction repeats things we’ve already read: Sidewalk Labs wants to be the lead developer on Villiers West, which will be the Google Canadian branch HQ. In the rest of the area, Sidewalk Labs would

• provide the design standards and guidelines (the rules for the district);
• work with a government partner to plan, design and implement everything;
• provide particular core technologies; and
• possibly provide financing. (p. 262)

As I’ve previously noted, these roles would place Sidewalk Labs at the heart of waterfront governance rule-setting.

A reminder that Sidewalk Labs is ambivalent as to Waterfront Toronto’s continued existence

Sidewalk Labs proposes that government designate a public entity to serve — or in the case of Waterfront Toronto, continue to serve — as revitalization lead for the IDEA District. (p. 260)

Sidewalk Labs: Developer as fixer

Sidewalk Labs presents itself here as a fixer, a company that can bring together a crack team to do whatever you want them to do it. They’re the visionaries; others will do most of the work.

It’s all very platform-y:

As a company founded to leverage the latest innovations to improve the quality of life in cities, Sidewalk Labs can bring together the expertise and tools required to devise, finance, and implement creative solutions to large- scale problems. (p. 260)

The River District’s Scale Is Necessary to Realize Priority Outcomes (pp. 263-269; not listed in Table of Contents)

And now we get to the hard sell, where we are told that “many” of the things they are planning for Quayside “can only become effective or financially feasible at the scale of the 62-hectare River District.” (p. 263).

In particular, as I noted in my previous post on the economic effects of this project, the “economic anchors” that seem to drive most of the project’s economic benefits – a Google HQ and a mass-timber factory with a guaranteed market – will only arise if Waterfront Toronto gives them all this land. (p. 264)

My question: exactly why does Sidewalk Labs/Google need all these other changes? Why not just locate its headquarters in the Eastern Waterfront and work on developing tech in laboratories and real-world conditions? Why do they need to rewire the rules and regulations and governance of an entire community to do this? After all, I’m assuming that not all of Sidewalk Labs’ future clients will want to change all their laws just to install smart street lights. So why not develop your tech under that realistic restriction? Why not try to implement technological solutions that fit clients’ existing circumstances?

And if Waterfront Toronto wants to kickstart development and thinks that an anchor company will do it (which also probably won’t work, but that’s an argument for another day), then why not cut all the extraneous stuff and just bring in the anchor? If all these changes are needed just to bring Google to town, is it worth it?

“Financially feasible”

This section also reminds us that Sidewalk Labs is a for-profit company. As a result, its claim that Quayside is too small a parcel of land to develop these new technologies is based in large part on financial considerations. In other words, it would not be feasible for a for-profit company to do a lot of these things. (p. 266, e.g. re clean energy)

This reality highlights a very significant drawback to depending on for-profit companies to run your city or your research and development projects. Their bias will always be toward what will pay off financially, and on their desired timeline, not what is socially beneficial or (key point) what will only become profitable in a time horizon beyond what a company is comfortable with.

Despite all its talk about how it can depend on Google’s deep pockets to have a lengthy time horizon, Sidewalk Labs is telling us that this horizon is not as long as they’re letting on. They’re in this to make lots of money in a certain period of time. They will focus on the shiny, sellable tech. They will focus on shorter development time frames than would governments.

They will also, if business conditions warrant it, abandon Toronto. Or if politicians don’t play ball with them once they’re ensconced here, which amounts to the same thing. Because they’re a money-making business. That’s their deal. Governments can’t leave a town, but companies can and will and do if their bottom line is threatened.

Public funding of Light Rail Transit

Another reminder that the public would be on the hook for light rail costs, either in terms of public funding or financing (possibly backed by future tax revenues from all the awesome stuff that this project will yield). (p. 268)

Also, Sidewalk Labs argues that merely the provision of light rail “would become a fundamental driver of the east- ern waterfront’s economic development strategy, accelerating the creation of thriving new transit-first neighbourhoods” (p. 268). Possibly. But if so, then why not just build the line? Are all of Sidewalk Labs’ other changes needed? What is their marginal contribution to growth?

Also, I’d love to see a comparative analysis of the benefits of building Sidewalk Labs/Google’s light rail and using that money for transit in other parts of the city. This proposal is silent on that bit of information.

Bottom line is, if you want economic development, a climate-positive neighbourhood, affordable housing and a “21^st century mobility network” (including LRT. They really want that LRT.), it’s everything or nothing.

A Pivotal Moment for the Future of the Eastern Waterfront (pp. 272-279; not listed in Table of Contents)

Mostly history and a continued sales pitch for developing this area. The amount of PR and promises – as opposed to actual plans – in this document is draining.

Touted ways their proposed changes would “add[] value to the Port Lands Planning Framework” (p. 275):

• Villiers Island “as a major economic hub” (i.e. the Google effect)
• Preparing for self-driving vehicles (see previous discussions about the policy discussions this move is pre-empting, and also the possibility the tech won’t work out)
• Developing advanced energy infrastructure
• Planning for greater density to unlock a transit expansion and sustainable development (read: we really want that light rail line but not, you know, enough to pay for it ourselves)
• Expand the supply of affordable and below-market housing
• Accelerating the development timeline (ah, timeline promises: the bane of planners and politicians)

Maybe governments can actually do development?

While the investment in the Port Lands Flood Protection Project is extraordinary, it is only a first step. Substantial additional investments are required to fully unlock the area’s potential. (p. 277)

A reminder of how Sidewalk Labs’ proposal builds on a massive, $1.25 billion, Waterfront Toronto-coordinated public investment. Any private return on investment they make if this project goes forward will be due entirely to this public investment.

The River District Can Anchor a Renewed Eastern Waterfront (pp. 280-291; not listed in Table of Contents)

And we’re back to full-page pictures. Which is a bit of a relief as it gives me a break from reading, but also depressing because it means I have to work my way through yet another empty-calorie section that repeats so much of what I’ve already read.

Added bonus: pages 282-291 are lifted wholesale from the Overview (pp. 136 (excerpt); 144-147), only with different pictures.

These Overview sections should’ve come with a note saying, “For the exact same information, please consult Volume 1, pages 280-291.”

Previous Master Innovation and Development Plan liveblog entries and relevant documents available here

As if Sidewalk Labs’ MIDP wasn’t long enough, I decided I wanted to go deeper into the world they’ve created. If the MIDP is The Lord of the Rings (spoiler: only in length; it would be sacrilege to suggest otherwise), then the Master Innovation and Development Plan Technical Appendix is The Silmarillion: More world-building detail transacted at tedious length.

For all that, like The Silmarillion, these Technical Appendices can be enlightening.*

For example, I’ve been wondering what, exactly, is driving Sidewalk Labs’ anticipated economic effects. As it happens, while reading through the MIDP’s endnotes I realized that they had published a whole series of appendices that they didn’t bother to include with their 1,500-page four-volume report. Maybe they were worried that people would balk at the extra reading?

Anyway, among these documents is an economic impact analysis by urbanMetrics, which makes for some interesting reading.

So, on what’s driving Sidewalk Labs’ economic-growth predictions. As far as I can tell, the sustained economic growth (as opposed to one-time boosts from construction) envisioned by Sidewalk Labs would come primarily from Google’s Canadian branch headquarters’ presence in the Eastern Waterfront, the creation of a mass-timber construction industry, and a weakening of city bylaws.

On Google’s presence in the Eastern Waterfront, urbanMetrics notes:

Notwithstanding the range of other urban innovations proposed, this initiative alone presents an opportunity to cement the Eastern Waterfront as an innovative new district that could become an industry leader in advancing city-based technologies. (p. 15, emphasis added)

a proposal to relocate Google’s Canadian Headquarters to the Eastern Waterfront and establishing a corresponding Urban Innovation Cluster collectively represent a significant divergence from the types of traditional mixed-use development likely to prevail at this location in the absence of SWL. This will alter the core composition of the resulting employment base in this area, as well as the corresponding level and type of output from local businesses. (p. 13)

On a tall-timber industry

This initiative marks a significant departure from more traditional steel and concrete forms of development, which continue to dominate the construction landscape across North America.

Despite the significant environmental, cost and building efficiency benefits of timber-based construction, it has not yet been utilized on such a large scale to date; particularly in the Toronto context. (p. 16)

On weakening regulation (“radical mixed use”):

As demand for space changes through inevitable market cycles and technological advances, the SWL vision establishes an unparalleled degree of flexibility to avoid lengthy and expensive reconstruction projects and time delays in repositioning assets for various uses. This type of modularity also delivers significant benefit to individual businesses that could occupy space in these building, reflecting their own expansion and growth patterns over time. (p. 16)

They also highlight tourism as a potential economic driver. Unfortunately, of these potential ongoing contributors to economic growth, urbanMetrics only provides an economic model for tourism. However, it seems pretty clear that urbanMetrics at least recognizes that it’s Google’s presence via a branch headquarters that is the real game-changer, not any of Sidewalk Labs’ vapourware innovations.

Is Sidewalk Labs running a Google HQ2 play?

Which raises the question:

Are we witnessing a Google-themed rerun of Amazon’s HQ2 play, in which cities debased themselves to offer sweet concessions to bring a big company to town?

Consider what Toronto, Ontario and Canada could be giving to Google/Sidewalk Labs for the privilege of their presence:

• A new light rail line in its preferred area;
• Cheaper-than-market-value land;
• Extensive weakening and/or changes of laws and regulations at every level of government, including minimal apartment sizes;
• A share of tax revenue going forward; and
• A dedicated market for a risky mass timber product.

Looked at from this perspective, it certainly seems like one of Sidewalk Labs’ main goals is to get Google a good deal on its headquarters on the most favourable conditions possible.

If the presence of Google HQ either is or is seen as the centrepiece of Sidewalk Labs’ proposal, the whole thing starts to seem less like a 21^st century innovation district and more like the 21^st-century digital equivalent of a free trade zone, or maquiladora, subject to its own rules. Once established, the overriding objective becomes keeping the foreign companies happy so that they won’t leave when they’re offered a better deal elsewhere.

* I should probably admit that I’ve never actually read The Silmarillion – its reputation precedes it. But it’s a good analogy, right?

It’s the the final part of my voyage through Part 2 of Chapter 1 of Volume 1. Or, as I like to call it, the Middle of the End of the Beginning of the MIDP.

Previous Master Innovation and Development Plan liveblog entries and relevant documents available here

Part 2.6: Digital Innovation (pp. 230-243; not listed in the Table of Contents)

In this section, Sidewalk Labs begins to set out its data-governance plan, which for the moment consists mainly of general intentions and proposals.

This section is all about Sidewalk Labs setting standards that would give it and Google significant leverage in other markets (standards are power), and defining data in such a way (i.e., a very slippery definition of something called “urban data”) that gives it and other companies access to data generated in Quayside, including data for advertising purposes.

Which Sidewalk Labs has fought every step of the way

Toronto and Ontario have taken some important initial strides to advance the conversation around data governance principles. (p. 232)

Toronto Star headline, August 14, 2018: “Sidewalk Labs unveils plans for timber towers, raincoats for buildings in Quayside, but Torontonians must wait for data details”

Key components of its data-governance plan

Distinction between urban and non-urban data: your regular reminder that urban data is a term that does not exist in Canadian law, leaving Sidewalk Labs with a lot of leeway to define it in its own interest.

An “open digital infrastructure” that will use “urban data to improve quality of life.” This would involve a “standardized mount system” that would “eliminate vendor lock-in” and would allow Sidewalk Labs a shot a setting a global standard. (p. 233)

“Open and secure” data standards. A set of publish standards around open-data architecture, access and sources”

Goal: to allow third parties to build on Sidewalk Labs’ system (i.e., creating a platform) (p. 233)

Question: is Sidewalk Labs’ standardized mount, “Koala,” a proprietary design?

New bureaucracy: An Urban Data Trust

anchored by a Responsible Data Use (RDU) Assessment — an in-depth review that is triggered by any proposal to collect or use urban data — and guided by a set of RDU Guidelines that incorporates globally recognized Privacy by Design principles. (p. 233)

• The Urban Data Trust would be “independent,” “not controlled by either Sidewalk Labs or Waterfront Toronto”
• It would have a five-person board and a Chief Data Officer
• It would approve “all collection or use of urban data in Quayside”
• It would only cover “urban data” (other types of data are not covered by this section) (p. 240)

More details apparently are in Volume 2.

It would be responsible for establishing “a set of Responsible Data Use (RDU) Guidelines that would apply to all entities seeking to collect or use urban data in the IDEA District, incorporating globally recognized Privacy by Design principles.” (p. 240)

Sidewalk Labs would play a key role in setting these policies, which, again, would be based on a category “urban data” that it has defined.

According to Sidewalk Labs, this policy should be governed by the following principles:

• Beneficial purpose for urban data’s use;
• transparent and clear notification to individuals about how this data would be collected.
• Minimize data collection with the least-invasive technology
• Publicly accessible data by default (property de-identified or non-personal data). No matter that it’s becoming increasingly clear that truly deanonymizing data is an impossible task.
• No selling or advertising without explicit consent. Of course, urban data by definition is collected in public spaces where it is pretty much impossible to get valid individual consent. So, consent would have to happen in another way; i.e., via mass consent.
  • Here’s the problem: Smart cities require ubiquitous surveillance and data collection. Getting individual consent for data collected from an individual’s movement through a public space is pretty much impossible. So consent would have to be done in a pre-determined manner (e.g., by merely entering the space, or by posting a sign, or). In other words, the Urban Data Trust is the only organization that can define what “mass individual consent” actually entails. It’s not going to shut down the smart city. Rather we’ll find that getting legal (but ethically fraudulent) “individual consent” can be achieved simply through a bit of bureaucratic manoeuvring, of defining the problem away. This is a good example of how Sidewalk Labs’ commitment to actual individual privacy is much less than it seems.
• Responsible AI principles (all these on p. 241).

It would also

implement and manage a process for approving the responsible collection and use of urban data anchored by a publicly auditable Responsible Data Use (RDU) Assessment — an in-depth review that is triggered by any proposal to collect or use urban data. (p. 240; proposed rules listed on page 241)

Data use

Urban data produced by Sidewalk Labs’ platform would be “publicly accessible, enabling companies, community members, and other third parties to use it as a foundation to build new tools.” (p. 233)

Questions:

• How would this use be qualified?
• To what extent would this involve the possibility of privatizing public services?
• Since this data would be produced from (Canadian/Toronto) residents and Toronto geography, will Canadian governments, NGOs and/or companies have priority access to this data? Otherwise, one could easily anticipate the monopolization of this level of services by data giants like Google.
• Who will maintain the platform? (Sidewalk Labs, I think.)
• For how long?
• What happens after the first contract finishes?
• What will the public authorities do to ensure that the city isn’t held hostage to Sidewalk Labs as the keeper of the platform?

Its promises for “best-in-class resiliency and security” are just that – promises – unless and until we see exactly what they are doing, beyond their current list of things the company (which isn’t a city) currently uses (p. 239).

What’s not here

What about “non-urban data”? Maybe it’ll be discussed later?

Public Engagement (pp. 244-249)

Nothing to see here: This part is repeated word-for-word from the Overview.

Next up

We have a Very Special Episode for Post 20: a quick look at the economic analysis underlying Sidewalk Labs’ projections and we all learn an important life lesson. See you there.

In which Sidewalk Labs promotes the innovative nature of building tinier-than-currently-allowed apartments and I note the irony of Sidewalk Labs touting a transparency app in what is easily the most poorly designed non-transparent document I’ve ever had the misfortune to spend three weeks reading.

But enough of my petty complaining. Let’s get straight to activitivating,  shall we?

Previous Master Innovation and Development Plan liveblog entries and relevant documents available here

Part 2.3: Buildings and Housing (pp. 168-196; not listed in the Table of Contents)

Changing regulations: A “digital building code”

a proposed digital building code system could help ensure that this vibrant mix of uses can thrive without creating nuisances, such as noise.

This proposal assumes that specific and easily measurable criteria – most notably noise – are the only reasons why manufacturing and residential have traditionally been separated. I would like to hear from municipal experts about why we have the current separation of building/activity types, and what is being gained and lost from this proposal.

The mass timber bet

It drives Sidewalk Labs’ cost projections and environmental commitment (p. 172) Also, it doesn’t yet exist. It may work out. Or it may not. That’s how innovation works.

Also, they want to save money via “Factory-produced buildings.” (p. 173) I’d love for an expert to weigh in on this proposal (which, again, remains an aspiration supported here by some pretty drawings).

“Flexible building interiors” (p. 178)

I’d like to see some actual designs and plans, certified by an engineer saying that these can actually work and won’t collapse, please. Instead, all we have again are aforementioned pretty drawings and a reference to “design concepts” from three architecture firms (p. 181). If actual plans exist, they’re not referenced in this section. I also want to see the architecture firms interrogated in public, by qualified engineers, regarding the viability of their mock-ups. In short, how theoretical are these proposals? How far away from being street-ready are they?

I don’t mean to sound too much like a broken record, but this is not a plan; it’s the world’s largest sales brochure.

Affordable housing

On page 191, we get some insight into how Sidewalk Labs would create affordable housing:

Smaller apartments (7% smaller on average), allowing for more units, including Murphy beds, “convertible furniture, built-in-shelfing and fold-out tables. … ” and off-site storage for their stuff, and tool (e.g., ladders) rental. This tool rental is referred to as “borrowing,” but given Sidewalk Labs’ tendency to want to charge for everything it can think of, I’m betting this would end up being a rental service.

Also, “communal spaces,” co-living units that sound like rooming houses or roommate flats, where people could rent out spare rooms for visiting relatives or to host “dinner parties.”

I would be curious as to who would be interested in living in a pod with a Murphy bed, sharing a kitchen and dining room with roommates. Because that’s what Sidewalk Labs is selling here. It all sounds like a way to cram as many poor people into a small as spaces as possible, while ensuring that more room exists to sell much-bigger condos to rich people. Or maybe it’s for single workaholic tech bros?

Their mass timber dream would also contribute to health, through reduced stress from people looking at wood.  This is based on research finding reduced stress “that have been shown to occur with exposure to nature in cities.”

The story of Jamie (pp. 192-195)

I’m not sure that the story that Sidewalk Labs is using to sell their unique flexible housing is telling the story that they think it is. First, it’s as much a story about financing as it is about housing. Second, it describes a person who doesn’t want to live outside of a, what, six-block, area his entire life. That Sidewalk Labs is proposing a mix of dwellings is fine, but it’s also kind of banal.

Part 2.4: Sustainability (pp. 198-213; not listed in the Table of Contents)

According to this section, Sidewalk Labs would hit its environmental goals by improving insulation, making buildings airtight, better filtering and more efficient air conditioning. (p. 200)

Also: a district-wide thermal grid relying on “clean energy sources” (p. 202), such as geothermal energy, waste heat, wastewater heat, and assuming solar panels and batteries (pp. 203-204). This is something that requires a system built on the level of the wider waterfront area Sidewalk Labs would like to control.

Also: an app that would allow you to manage your energy use. (p. 205)

I would like to hear from some independent engineers on the feasibility of this proposal. Also, Sidewalk Labs is all about telling us about how this would work if everything goes right. We also need to know, and what could go wrong?

On waste disposal (p. 209): I want to know who’s going to fix all this when it breaks down, what the maintenance budget is going to look like, and the skills needed by the people who are going to keep this complex system going.

Stormwater management (p. 210-213). Not my area of expertise.

Part 2.5: Social Infrastructure (pp. 214-229; not listed in the Table of Contents)

• Sidewalk Labs would not directly provide community services. (p. 216)
• It proposes allocating 90,000 square feet toward social infrastructure (question: how much of this is flex space?) (p. 216)
• It proposes “supporting local community organizations and service providers with expertise, digital prototypes, resources, and planning to bring innovative service delivery models to the community.” Question: How much would it charge for these services? (p. 216)
• It proposes working “with partners to ensure that critical services are accessible to all populations, including the most vulnerable.” Question: How long is this service commitment for? What does a for-profit development company know about social services? (p. 216) One possible answer, on p. 120: through below-market rents (p. 120) and possibly provision of its “expertise, including support on technical roadmaps for new or existing digital tools that could meaningfully improve outcomes, efficiency, and experience.” (p. 221) Question: What does Sidewalk Labs know about community services? Google, on the other hand, is building an expertise in this area.
• It proposes getting “a local partner to convene health care and community service providers; working together with the community, this group could explore opportunities to provide proactive, integrated, digitally enabled, and holistic service delivery offerings.” (p. 216)

Super-innovative: A government-transparency app.

This is all a bit vague:

To complement the physical space, fully accessible digital tools — both those already existing in the market and others created in partnership with the community — could help people to participate in civic life, collaborate, and shape their neighbourhood and help governing bodies to undertake more transparent, inclusive, and responsive decision-making. (p. 217)

What’s interesting here is Sidewalk Labs’ implicit view of what makes for good governance, namely full transparency as it relates to decision-making. This perspective is embedded in its description of Collab its prototype “digital tool.”

According to Sidewalk Labs, Collab:

engages community members in local decisions that can shape their neighbourhood, such as programming in a central public space, through a transparent process that reveals the decision-making framework and all community inputs. Users propose their choices for events in their community, and then the tool walks them through the trade-offs associated with each proposal — a farmers market provides fresh produce and draws a lot of foot traffic, but the space may feel too congested for a community picnic — and how their individual choices impact the community. (p. 217, emphasis added)

This app does hide a lot of the politics under the hood – who decides how issues are framed what tradeoffs are included/ignored, that everyone involved is fully informed about the issues, that all issues should be open to majority vote (think: minority rights), that there is no role for elected representatives – but for the moment, consider the bitter irony of its inclusion in this proposal.

The Master Innovation and Development Plan and the process leading up to it is the goateed evil twin of Collab, its anthesis, its negation. The MIDP proposes fuzzy, aspirational projects in the most opaque way possible, with relevant information for single parts of the project (such as the Open Space Alliance) scattered over 1,500 pages, with no complete description in any one place.

It does not include any talk of the tradeoffs involved in its choices. And the refusal of Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalk Labs to release key documents or to deal with key issues in a timely manner throughout the past two years has made the process anything but transparent.

For health and social services

The “Care Collective”: “for the co-location of preventive support, health care, and community services as well as offering leases at below-market rates to ensure a diverse set of service providers, including non- profit organizations.” (p. 220)

Sidewalk Labs invents the community centre!

the Civic Assembly, a place for gathering, learning, and engaging amongst the community. (p. 217)

This space would be operated by Sidewalk Labs (which presumably would be the landlord), working with others to plan its operations. (p. 225)

Private-public partnerships come for elementary school children!

To begin activitivating [typo, or a new business line? In a world where an “Assembly” refers to a physical space and not a group of people, nothing seems real anymore] opportunities for learning throughout the community, Sidewalk Labs is pursuing collaborations with educational leaders in Toronto. Sidewalk Labs and the Toronto Public Library (TPL) are currently exploring opportunities to seamlessly integrate the library’s presence throughout Quayside, building on the theme of learning happening everywhere.

These opportunities could include pop-up learning labs or lending services; TPL-developed classes, particularly those that support data, AI, and algorithmic literacy; or digital consult rooms in library branches or pop-up library stations that could allow residents to easily book a private session or meeting with service providers. (p. 228)

This section would seem to invite a conversation about whether or to what extent private companies should be invited into the classroom.

Another few sections finished. Let’s make #activitivating happen!