I am of several minds about Waterfront Toronto’s Note to Reader. As a guide to the Master Innovation and Development Plan, it’s a bit of a mess, but it’s a mess that I recognize, understand and empathize with. As an analysis, it raises many good points, including a few I missed in my own review (mostly I think because Waterfront Toronto has access to information that I don’t. Or maybe I flatter myself). But as an official Waterfront Toronto document, it shouldn’t exist at all.
In other words, it’s par for the Quayside course.
It me
The Note to Reader summarizes the MIDP, provides some context, offers some critiques and suggests some questions. In other words, it’s exactly like the briefing notes and legislative summaries I used to prepare as a researcher with the Library of Parliament.
Overall, it’s pretty overwhelming and also a bit of a mess. Which is understandable because, as I’ve noted so many times over the past month, the underlying MIDP is a mess.
I’m pretty sure, based on professional experience, that I know how this went down. Waterfront Toronto gave, say, six analysts a week or less to summarize and analyze specific sections of the report, then did a bit of quality control (probably more than seems to have gone into the actual MIDP) to help everything to more or less line up, and then published it. Given these constraints, the analysts and writers at Waterfront Toronto did an amazing job to produce a document as coherent as this. I read it quickly (I’m exactly as burned out on MIDP-related docs as you might imagine), but it seems to hit all the key points. Sure, they could’ve produced a somewhat more coherent document, but not in the time allotted.
From one analyst to another, if you worked on this report and run into me at a bar, and you didn’t take my past 49 posts as a personal affront, I’ll buy you a beer. Good job.
What is this weird document?
While professionally the Note to Reader is a quality piece of work (given the constraints the authors faced), and I don’t think I have any complaints about the summary part of the document, the oddest thing about it is that it exists at all. It’s the Executive Summary that should’ve been included in the report proper; it’s what the Overview document should’ve been.
It’s also a summary written by an organization that, by its own admission, was (and is) still in the process of figuring out exactly what’s in the MIDP and what it all means. Moreover that it was published before the public had had a chance to have its say was odd, to say the least. I would’ve expected a government agency to wait to hear from the public before issuing what is effectively its response to the MIDP.
Then there’s the problematic matter of the non-arm’s-length relationship between Sidewalk Labs and Waterfront Toronto. The Note to Reader is a critique of a document by an organization for which the Plan Development Agreement, signed July 31, 2018, and renewed a year later, assigned joint responsibility.
It’s rewriting history a bit to note, as the Note to Reader does, that
The PDA outlined the parameters under which Sidewalk Labs would develop a proposal for Waterfront Toronto’s consideration. While Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalk Labs did work together earlier in the process to do research, generate ideas, and consult the public, the roles of the two organizations then separated, allowing Waterfront Toronto to focus on creating a robust framework for review and evaluation of the MIDP. Sidewalk Labs’ responsibility is to prepare and submit the MIDP. (p. 48)
In a very early post, I ran through the many, many, many places that the PDA gave both Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalk Labs joint responsibility for the preparation of the MIDP. You can’t just wish that away.
The fact of the matter is, the two organizations are – for better or worse – joined at the hip. This leads the reader to suspect Waterfront Toronto’s motives in raising these critiques. Which is not to say that Waterfront Toronto doesn’t make some very good points: it was heartening to see the in-writing recognition that Villiers Island was out of scope, and that Waterfront Toronto also has issues with Sidewalk Labs being in charge of procurement (p. 51).
It’s that critiquing a report that you were formally charged with producing is all a bit … off. The relationship is such that the two organizations cannot be separated. And so we outsiders cannot know for certain whether these critiques are seriously deal-breakers, or whether they’re all for show, offering the illusion of democratic accountability. To be blunt, I’m not sure how far I can trust Waterfront Toronto.
All up in the air
As it happens, minutes after I finished reading the Note to Reader and typing up a preliminary blog post, Waterfront Toronto announced that it and Sidewalk Labs were extending the Plan Development Agreement by six months, and Waterfront Toronto had given Sidewalk Labs until October 31 to address several fundamental concerns with the MIDP. So what happens next, I have no idea.
I do know that its purpose as a “Guide to reading the draft Master Innovation and Development Plan proposal submitted by Sidewalk Labs” was undercut by the fact that it was prepared before Waterfront Toronto had had an opportunity to digest and fully understand the report. I can recognize a hot take and a deadline-driven document when I see it. Its rushed production necessarily limits its utility to the public.
Moreover, the rushed public consultations for which it was prepared, running for three weeks in July, remain a terrible idea.
That said, as I write this (early August, and reviewing it in late August — time travel!), I’m still uncertain what form the upcoming consultations will take, or what the timeline should be. Given Waterfront Toronto’s October 31 ultimatum, I see no sense in Waterfront Toronto publishing either a report on the summer consultations, or issuing its own pre-October 31 report, or holding public consultations before we’ve seen Sidewalk Labs’ response.
But even this talk of extended consultations and consideration is being too generous to Sidewalk Labs. This company has failed, over the past 18 months and so many extensions, to come up with a minimally satisfactory proposal that stuck to the original RFP and didn’t require things that Waterfront Toronto couldn’t possibly deliver. The changes requested by Waterfront Toronto go to the heart of Sidewalk Labs’ MIDP; it doesn’t deserve a rewrite.
Where does this leave us?
So we’ll see.
Personally, in terms of this blogging project, which began over a month ago with the Auditor General of Ontario’s examination of Waterfront Toronto, the Note to Reader, while problematic for the reasons mentioned above, was a nice way to end a journey through some of the most reader-hostile public documents I’ve ever had the mispleasure to endure. So much of the MIDP was so obviously a sales job designed to mask some unbelievably audacious asks that it was draining to get through: it’s difficult to read a document that is designed to mislead and confuse.
I remain far from convinced that Waterfront Toronto is fully owning either its role in this project or the consequences of the events it has set in motion; I’ve already pointed out one instance of what seems to me to be a bit of historical revisionism. I also don’t think that Waterfront Toronto has demonstrated that it is capable of implementing even a scaled-back version of a smart-city project. (Then again, recall that the Ontario Auditor General noted that the province was similarly lacking in this capacity.)
And although Waterfront Toronto has committed to consulting with the other levels of government and effectively giving them a veto over whether the project will go forward, I have no idea how much this promise is worth. Ontario Premier Doug Ford has called the MIDP “a terrible deal for the taxpayers” but I’m not sure what this will mean in concrete terms. Toronto will apparently be holding consultations of some sort. And the Trudeau government apparently is deferring to the Waterfront Toronto board, so I guess no separate, independent oversight from that level of government.
All the more reason to make Quayside a federal election issue, an issue I’ll revisit in a final, wrap-up op-ed that’ll be published soon.
Still, on a professional level, I recognize and appreciate it when a document has been prepared by people who are trying to help others understand the world, to explain rather than to sell us something. Or at least not mainly to sell us something.
For a report whose very existence is problematic, the Note to Reader is – mostly – an honest document. The same cannot be said for Sidewalk Labs’ Master Innovation and Development Plan.
Again, these chapters contain summary information of what we’ve already seen, supplemented with some specific details that I’ve noted. The best way to use this post is as a guide to specific topics that you may be interested in.
This chapter comprehensively reviews the financial terms associated with the proposed project, including the assumptions underlying the expected revenue, expenses, and returns associated with the overall transaction. (p. 39)
Introduction (pp. 150-155)
Summary of foreseen benefits and commitments by Sidewalk Labs.
A reminder, not often stated in this report, that this is a $39 billion project.
Table of sources and uses of funds: pages 154-155
Part 1: Sources and Uses of Funds (pp. 156-165)
Real estate at Quayside and Villiers West (pp. 157-160)
This Part discusses how Quayside and Villiers West could be valued. I’m not an expert in land valuation, so I will leave this to others, but it seems to be based on whether you concentrate on the returns it could currently generate based on existing zoning, etc. rules; whether you deliver a scenario that fits Waterfront Toronto’s stated objectives; or whether you take into account all the amazing innovation and economic development this project will deliver for the city.
I think the argument here is that Waterfront Toronto should give Sidewalk Labs a discount based on the amazing-innovation scenario for Quayside. And that “To protect Waterfront Toronto if Quayside’s returns are higher than anticipated, Sidewalk Labs proposes to pay Waterfront Toronto an earnout — a share of upside value above an agreed-upon return threshold — from the Quayside proceeds.” (p. 159)
A question for building and municipal experts: is this type of payout usual?
Infrastructure finance (pp. 161-163)
The proposal: leverage future growth to fund current infrastructure investment. Or governments could do public investment.
LRT financing, which we’ve previously discussed, is on page 161. Municipal infrastructure financing is on page 162, and advanced systems financing on pages 162-163.
Additional Sidewalk Labs investments (p. 164)
Timber factory: up to $80 million (alongside partners)
Venture capital: $10 million, alongside partners, including one or more local venture capital firms
To create the MIDP: $65 million ($US50 million)
Urban Innovation Institute: $10 million grant
Third-party real estate catalyzation (p. 165)
Sidewalk Labs’ internal analysis suggests that beyond Quayside and Villiers West, the IDEA District could generate an additional $29 billion in real estate investment. (p. 165)
Part 2: Public Sector Impact (pp. 166-173)
Measured in terms of property taxes, development charges and total proceeds from the sale of public land, measured through 2050. (p. 167)
A reminder: The further out your projections, the more of a fantasy they become. And as far as I can tell from the charts in this part, the biggest advances don’t happen until the mid-2040s, over 20 years from now. Or, in other words, after self-driving cars have conquered the streets.
Discount these numbers as you see fit.
Part 3: Sidewalk Labs’ Returns (pp. 174-179)
I think we’ve covered this sufficiently. Market returns for financing and real estate, investment in a mass-timber factory, fees for services. Oh, and three performance payments:
Sidewalk Labs would receive an initial payment in 2028 and additional payments in 2032 and 2035, if it achieves additional project milestones. To earn these performance payments Sidewalk Labs must meet growth and performance targets related to the acceleration of development and the achievement of Waterfront Toronto’s priority outcomes. (p. 178)
The targets:
2028: Delivery of Google Canada HQ (A hard one to miss, given that Google and Sidewalk Labs are pretty much the same company)
2032 and 2035: increased development activity measured against a TBD baseline.
In advance of signing Implementation Agreements, the parties would negotiate metrics and target thresholds tied to each priority outcome — job creation, sustainability, mobility, affordability, and urban innovation — for each performance payment.
And also, though they don’t mention it (but should), one big return to Sidewalk Labs is the ability to use Toronto as a calling card for other projects and to develop the skills needed for Sidewalk Labs to get work in other cities.
Page 179 provides a table of their proposed potential revenue sources.
This chapter presents a series of tables indicating how the various elements of the MIDP advance” Waterfront Toronto objectives, as “first identified in its RFP and elaborated on in the PDA. (p. 49)
There’s nothing here we haven’t seen a million times already, so feel free to check out whatever interests you. The only thing I can think to add is that this Chapter doesn’t even bother to report results at the Quayside level – it’s all IDEA District, all the time.
Introduction (pp. 182-183)
Part 1: Job Creation and Economic Development (pp. 184-185)
Confirming once again that the economic anchor of this proposal is the Villiers West-located Google Branch headquarters and the Urban Innovation Institute. (p. 184) These two projects don’t have much to do with Quayside, do they?
Part 2: Sustainability and Climate-Positive Development (pp. 186-187)
Part 3: Housing Affordability (pp. 188-189)
Part 4: New Mobility (pp. 190-191)
Part 5: Urban Innovation (pp. 192-193)
Ah! The Urban Data Trust is about “protecting … the public good.” (p. 192)
This chapter describes how the MIDP would be implemented, describing the Implementation Agreements, timelines, and approval processes. (p. 49)
Check it out. My takeaway is that they want this to happen quickly, but I’m not sure how fast various levels of government can (or will) move to accommodate Sidewalk Labs/Google’s wishes.
Part 1: Approval Process, Transaction, and Implementation Timeline (pp. 196-201)
In which we are treated to a timeline of the development of the MIDP and future implementation, if accepted. Here, we learn that Waterfront Toronto in December 2018 “introduced a series of goals and objectives as well as a set of priority outcomes for the MIDP,” and “shared a list of process-focused requirements for the implementation of proposals included in the MIDP, with particular focus on an approach to data privacy and governance.” (p. 196)
Waterfront Toronto did not co-create the MIDP. While Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalk Labs did work together earlier in the process to do research, generate ideas, and consult the public, the roles of the two organizations then separated, allowing Waterfront Toronto to focus on creating a robust framework for review and evaluation of the MIDP. Sidewalk Labs’ responsibility is to prepare and submit the MIDP. (Open Letter from Waterfront Toronto Board Chair, Stephen Diamond regarding Quayside)
On the MIDP evaluation process
We also get some interesting details on what Sidewalk Labs expects the consultation process would look like:
Sidewalk Labs anticipates that Waterfront Toronto will undertake additional public consultation and analysis as part of its formal review and assessment of the draft MIDP. This assessment will likely inform further revisions to the MIDP by Sidewalk Labs. (p. 197)
Depending on when Waterfront Toronto issues its formal MIDP review, the three-week July consultations may be the most consequential input the public gets into this process.
Lending even more credence to the notion that the summer consultations were the most important ones is Sidewalk Labs’ note that it
estimates that the initial approvals for the project [by all three levels of government, I believe] could be completed by Q1 2020. (p. 197)
That does not leave a lot of time for consultation or consideration, by several levels of government.
[Note: This post was written mere minutes before Waterfront Toronto announced that it and Sidewalk Labs would be extending the review process. Given that I’m doing these posts on my own time, I decided to let them stand as they were rather than figure out how to revise all these posts in light of this new uncertainty. As I write this particular note, it’s unclear when the public review will happen, or whether it will be focused on this MIDP or a later version, or whether or when Waterfront Toronto will issue a formal reply to this MIDP. Basically, who knows what’s going to happen!]
Part 2: Phase 1 Project Delivery Timeline: Quayside Plan (pp. 202-203)
Page 203 has the Quayside timeline. [Note: The above note holds for all of these timelines.]
Part 3: Phase 2 Project Delivery Timeline: Villiers West Urban Innovation Campus (pp. 204-205)
Page 205 has the Villiers West timeline.
Chapter 6: Stage Gates and Risk Mitigation (pp. 206-215)
This chapter addresses the mechanisms in the transaction designed to ensure that the project advances in phases and limits risks to government and the public, including by requiring Sidewalk Labs to achieve a series of project milestones before advancing to successive stages of the project. (p. 49)
Introduction [listed in Table of Contents as “Stage Gates and Risk Mitigation” (pp. 208-215)
The milestones that would need to be met for everything to continue are listed in a table on page 210.
Additional strategies for managing the risks of innovation (pp. 212-215)
Pages 214 and 215 list the ways Sidewalk Labs would mitigate risks in this project. Worth a look if you’re interested. It doesn’t really have any more details about, say, realistic staffing levels for its proposed agencies.
Chapter 7: Overview of the Participants in IDEA District Development (pp. 216-219)
This chapter summarizes the roles and responsibilities proposed for Sidewalk Labs, Water- front Toronto, the public administrator, the City of Toronto, and other third parties in the success of the MIDP. (p 49)
Participants in the development of the IDEA District [Listed in the Table of Contents as “Overview of the Participants in IDEA District Development”] (pp. 218-219)
All here in two convenient pages. Covered elsewhere; summarized here.
Supplemental Tables (pp. 220-231)
This addendum provides informational tables with further details related to certain aspects of the proposal. (p. 49)
You know what would’ve looked great next to these supplemental tables? The Technical Appendix.
I. Management Entities (pp. 222-223)
We’ve covered all of these ad nauseum, and they don’t provide any answers to our most pressing questions (resources needed to do the job, how to address the inexperience issue). But it’s all in one place, so that’s something.
Open Space Alliance: p. 222
Urban Data Trust: p. 223
Waterfront Housing Trust: p. 223
Waterfront Sustainability Association: p. 223
Waterfront Transportation Management Association: p. 223
II. Regulatory Adjustments (pp. 224-226)
Again, covered in great detail above, but it’s all here over three pages. That’s a lot of laws to change adjust.
Mobility: p. 224
Public realm: p. 225
Buildings and housing: p. 225
Sustainability: p. 226
III. Initial Innovation Design Standards and Guidelines (pp. 227-229)
As they relate to:
Mobility: p. 227
Public realm: p. 227
Buildings and housing: p. 228
Sustainability: p. 228
Social infrastructure: p. 229
IV. Upfront Permissions (pp. 230-231)
These are the rules that need to change before they start the project. Check them out.
As they relate to:
Mobility: p. 230
Public realm: p. 231
Buildings and housing: p. 231
Sustainability: p. 232
Social infrastructure: p. 232
And that’s the entire MIDP.
My journey, however, is not yet complete. Up next is the final document on our journey, Waterfront Toronto’s oft-referenced Note to Reader. And then maybe a final summing-up post. Or I might just go curl up somewhere dry and dark and dream of a world without Byzantine smart city plans.
Sidewalk Labs would provide advisory services and management services in connection with planning, devising, constructing, integrating, delivering, and operating project-specific infrastructure and advanced systems for the IDEA District. (p. 85)
Planning services for municipal and advanced systems. Sidewalk Labs would partner with the public administrator in preparing the IDEA District Infrastructure and Transportation Master Plan (ITMP) documents, with special emphasis on the technical specifications and related considerations attendant to advanced systems and their integration with traditional municipal infrastructure. (p. 115)
Technical specifications and content development for the Innovation Framework. Sidewalk Labs would partner with the public administrator in developing the requirements and technical specifications for development… This would include the IDSG. (p. 115)
Sidewalk Labs would have the lead on the IDSG, including updating it “from time to time, in partnership with the public administrator” (WMOMNBWT). It would eventually apply to the entire IDEA District if adopted by the administrator (WMO…).
Page 115 also has a table of Sidewalk Labs’ public administration roles.
Payment for services
About $3 million annually for the first 15 years. (p. 115)
Implementation and operation phases
Sidewalk Labs would design municipal infrastructure in Quayside and Villiers West. Outside of these areas, Sidewalk Labs “would serve an integration role to coordinate municipal infrastructure designs prepared by the administrator with buildings and advanced systems infrastructure.”
For advanced systems outside of these two areas,
Sidewalk Labs would provide support in procuring operators and partners; work with the operators to integrate the systems in the IDEA District to achieve the envisioned technologically enabled outcomes; and work alongside the public administrator to ensure that the operators achieve and maintain acceptable performance levels. (p. 116)
Sidewalk Labs would not develop or manage the procurement of the Super-PON digital communications network proposed for the IDEA District. Instead, Sidewalk Labs would provide technical advice to the public administrator and Waterfront Toronto’s broadband internet partner, which is expected to deliver the digital communications network. (p. 116)
What technology Waterfront Toronto (or whatever ends up running this area) chooses for the communications network will reveal a significant amount about the nature of the power relationship between Sidewalk Labs/Google and the public administrator (WMO…). It’s kind of hard to believe that Waterfront Toronto would lure Google to town and not use its standard.
More fundamentally, given the tight relationship between Sidewalk Labs and Google, Sidewalk Labs should either have presented a few network options in the MIDP, or not presented the Super-PON network at all. It’s a pretty blatant conflict of interest that makes this late offer not to be involved in its selection appear weaker than was probably intended.
Support for management entities: Sidewalk Labs would provide technical assistance and advice to them. Nothing on what Sidewalk labs would do when it would be placed in a conflict of interest regarding procurement outside of Quayside and Villiers West. (p. 117)
Technical advisory services related to vertical development: It would provide these, e.g., as they relate to evaluation. No mention of potential conflicts of interest regarding plan evaluation. (p. 117)
Payment for services
8% fee for design management of certain municipal infrastructure (Quayside, Villiers West)
2% related costs for support in integrating municipal infrastructure with advanced systems infrastructure.
“Third- party operators would compensate Sidewalk Labs directly for its responsibilities as lead developer of advanced systems at Quayside and Villiers West. When the public administrator assumes the role of lead developer of advanced systems in later phases, the operator would similarly compensate the public administrator for its work.” (p. 117)
Role 3: Technology Deployment (pp. 120-127)
Sidewalk Labs would source or create key technological solutions needed to deliver on the MIDP targets. These would include a number of new technologies where no suitable alternative exists, including for mobility and digital innovation, that qualify as “purposeful solutions.” In addition, as part of this role, Sidewalk Labs would share profits of certain technologies deployed in connection with the project. (p. 85, emphasis added)
It’s kind of weird that the one example Sidewalk Labs uses to illustrate the development of a “necessary innovation if none exists” is Google’s Super-PON internet network” (p. 121), a digital system which it says it will not have a role in procuring. Although actually procuring something is less important than setting the standard, which may be what’s going on here.
Statements like this are also very misleading:
Sidewalk Labs anticipates that the total number of solutions it would develop itself represents a tiny fraction of the thousands of products to be deployed in connection with the project. (p.121)
Sidewalk Labs uses a similar argument throughout the MIDP in noting how small the parcels of land it is asking for in Villiers West and Quayside are in the context of the Eastern Waterfront. In both cases, the answer is the same: size is irrelevant. It’s the type and foundational nature of the tech that matters; in the case of land, it’s the fact that Sidewalk Labs is going beyond Quayside to demand Villiers West that matters. Sidewalk Labs’ framing is very misleading.
Sidewalk Labs’ four principles on digital tech (p. 122)
I’ve covered these elsewhere. I will note this on patents, however:
As a further means of advancing openness and innovation by third parties, Sidewalk Labs is making a “patent pledge,” that it would not assert its digital innovation hardware or software patents issued in Canada against any third party who develops and sells an innovation relying on those patents, with narrow exceptions (see Page 127).
This commitment would be a lot more powerful if it were made with reference to the world, as opposed to the tiny Canadian market.
Purposeful Solutions (pp. 123-125)
It looks like this is a term that Sidewalk Labs invented or is using in a novel way for this project. These are:
A limited set of innovations that are necessary to achieve agreed-upon project goals and for which there is no suitable alternative on the market. (p. 123)
These would be developed in-house by Sidewalk Labs and produced without competitive bidding. (p. 123)
Key to this process would be who decides when this can happen, and the review process. Otherwise, it would be open to enormous abuse for the installation of foundational systems and de facto standards.
While the MIDP spells out a couple of possibilities for adjudicating whether a no-competitive bidding, “purposeful solution” should be undertaken, the actual criteria would be left for the post-MIDP world.
One huge issue is that Sidewalk Labs’ involvement in the running of this whole area places it in a conflict of internet when it comes to the evaluation of these proposals. It does not seem like the MIDP fully considers this in this section. And at any rate, it just gives us some ideas, not an actual proposal that we can evaluate.
There’s also the question of how much Waterfront Toronto would have to change in order to develop the capacity to actually evaluate these proposals (I’m pretty certain they don’t currently have this capacity). And just hiring an independent evaluator won’t cut it; you still have to be knowledgeable to evaluate the evaluator’s report.
Profit-sharing for Waterfront Toronto from Testbed-Enabled Technology (pp. 126-127)
This is the intellectual property section.
“Sidewalk Labs is committed to sharing with the public sector proceeds from certain products or other solutions that would not have been developed but for the opportunity created by the project,” which they refer to as “Testbed-Enabled Technology” (p. 126). Whether a particular technology fit this description would be jointly determined following to-be-determined (of course) criteria. The general take for the administrator (WMO…) would be 10%.
Question: Is this a sufficient return on Canadians’ investment? Let the debate begin!
Role 4: Optional Infrastructure Financing (pp. 128-147)
Sidewalk Labs is prepared to arrange or enable front-end financing for the accelerated construction and support of certain critical infrastructure and advanced systems. (p. 85)
There is a useful list of definitions on page 129.
Role 4A: LRT financing (pp. 130-134)
TTC owned and operated (p. 128)
Total cost: $1.5 billion to $2 billion. (p. 132)
Sidewalk Labs would provide financing support, recommending borrowing against future increase in property value. (p. 133) Or public funds could be used (p. 134), which of course raises the question of what the best use of taxpayers’ money is. This question is not dealt with in the MIDP.
One big caution here: The economic payoffs to the city (e.g., tax revenue, economic output) all assume that everything goes off without a hitch. However, several proposals in this report depend on things that are outside of Sidewalk Labs’ control. The number of failures (and in a project like this, which is all about experimentation, things are going to fail) will almost certainly affect future revenues, and thus the viability of Sidewalk Labs’ financing proposal.
Role 4B: Municipal infrastructure (pp. 135-138)
city owned and operated (p. 128)
Total costs (p. 135): $240 million for Quayside; Villiers West: $180 million; IDEA District: $1.8 billion).
Sidewalk Labs proposes, among other things, a “local infrastructure contribution” that would be equivalent to “avoided costs” that would be realized due to the advanced nature of the neighbourhood. (p. 137)
The same caveat regarding actual versus projected outcomes applies here. Also, I’m not sure that Sidewalk Labs took into account businesses’ propensity to react differently to taxes than to costs that they never paid.
This is all a bit out my depth – you can check out the table on page 138 for more information.
Questions: Is front-end financing – financing something before developers move in – a usual practice? Maybe, if Google wants to be an owner here, they should pay a special developer’s fee?
Role 4C: Advanced systems (pp. 139-147)
privately owned and operated (except dynamic streets, which is city owned and WTMA operated) (p. 128)
This section is a reminder of just how much privately operated infrastructure would be present in this neighbourhood.
For me, it’s also a reminder that I may understand economics (more or less), but financing schemes are a bit beyond me. So, everyone else, have at it. It may be because I’m just over 100 pages from the end, but I’ll have to leave this section to others to figure out if it represents a smart plan. All I’ve got is the common-sensical points that:
Nobody rides for free; someone always ends up paying;
At least a part of business fees get passed onto the consumer/user;
If you’re borrowing against the future, and the future doesn’t pan out, then you’re in trouble; and
Public finding leaves the public on the hook when things go wrong.
Page 140 has a table of cost estimates for the advanced systems infrastructure proposed by Sidewalk Labs. Total cost: $2.1 billion)
User charges and the rest of Toronto
This was helpful to know: In charging for utilities:
Sidewalk Labs assumed that aggregate utility bills for end users could not exceed BAU rates by more than 5 to 10 percent.
And here:
Sidewalk Labs commissioned a preliminary cost-of-living analysis to determine how utility costs in the IDEA District would compare with other neighbourhoods in Toronto. This analysis
found that, depending on household composition and unit size, average utility costs in the IDEA District would be between 1.4 percent lower and 4.9 percent higher than standard rates. This is despite delivering a level of sustainability unavailable in other areas of the city. (p. 142)
As I think I’ve indicated throughout these posts, I’d been wondering if Sidewalk Labs had been thinking about how the costs of living in Quayside versus the rest of the city would affect things like apartment rentals and condo purchases. These lines suggest that they have, although I still wonder about whether other user charges have been factored into their analysis.
Additional expenses (p. 146)
Sidewalk Labs would receive some preliminary design fees, advanced system development fees (paid by third-party operators).
There would also be public administrator sustainability fees, the amount of which “would vary depending on the costs incurred and the nature and extent of the operations.”
Is it churlish to ask how much these fees might be, so we could judge whether they were reasonable?
Optional financing from Sidewalk Infrastructure Partners (pp. 146-147)
SIP would not privatize or operate Toronto’s existing traditional infrastructure, or affect expansions of traditional infrastructure systems (such as roads, highways, and transit) by the public or private sector. (p. 147)
One more post, and we’ll be at the end of our journey! Sort of.
The previous chapter dealt with the proposed role of the public administrator (WMOMNBWT) in governing the proposed “IDEA District.” Now, Sidewalk Labs tells us how they would be involved:
This chapter provides an in-depth review of the four proposed roles that Sidewalk Labs would play as Innovation and Funding Partner. (p. 48)
These roles are:
Role 1: Development of real estate and advanced systems.
Role 2: Innovation planning, design, and implementation.
Role 3: Technology deployment.
Role 4: Optional infrastructure financing. (p. 49)
Role 1: Development of Real Estate and Advanced Systems (pp. 86-113)
Real estate: It would be the lead developer of Quayside and Villiers West.
Advanced systems in Quayside and Villiers West: These are: “advanced power grid, thermal grid, waste management system, stormwater management system, freight management system, dynamic streets, district parking management system, digital communications network, and mobility subscription package.” (p. 84)
This role would involve identifying or partnering with “experience third-party operators wherever possible,” (a public-private-private partnership, if you wil) (p. 84)
Details of its build program, building design, housing, employment, social infrastructure, and public realm plans are found on pages 89-91. Most, if not all, of the details in this section have been covered elsewhere in this report (some of them, many times).
One theme that Sidewalk Labs seems to be developing here is the extent to which they are foregoing the easy money or are spending more than one would usually on a project like this:
Critically, as part of an overall transaction involving Villiers West, Sidewalk Labs is incur- ring higher-than-market real estate costs at Quayside, to prove the model — and to enable third-party developers to employ these same sustainable construction methods and innovative building systems on a cost-effective basis. (p. 87)
Proposing a development with lower density and forgoing a request for greater density reduce the financial upside of the project. (p. 89)
To realize the innovation agenda and desired outcomes, Sidewalk Labs would need to invest disproportionately in the development and implementation of these [advanced] systems. (p. 94)
One of the benefits of reading a very, very repetitive (very repetitive) report front-to-back is that we already know that these asides are laying the ground for an ask of a reduced price for Villiers West.
The Quayside Plan (pp. 88-97)
Quayside would serve as “proof of concept” for its plans:
As the lead vertical developer, Sidewalk Labs would enter into an agreement with Waterfront Toronto to plan, design, deliver, and operate a mixed-use, mixed-income development on the consolidated properties that together constitute Quayside. (p. 88)
The mechanics of the plan
“Waterfront Toronto:
“would sell its Quayside land holdings to Sidewalk Labs.”
“or the public administrator, would assist Sidewalk Labs in pursuing the necessary approvals, financial contributions, or other actions from the city or other orders of governments”
“would monitor the performance of Sidewalk Labs; and”
“would fulfill the various governance roles incumbent upon it as the public administrator of the IDEA District.”
They’ll need to change several laws before moving forward (p. 95) (covered in pages 230-231, at the very end of the report. Cliffhanger!)
As is common with real estate development projects, particularly for large-scale projects such as the one proposed, Sidewalk Labs would require a number of regulatory and planning permissions to proceed and implement the proposed innovations. (p. 95)
Question for municipal and building experts: How common are the types of changes Sidewalk Labs is asking for?
This might just be business as usual. This page, however, does not give me confidence that this is the case. Remember the list that I mentioned a blog post or two ago regarding the bylaw and other legal changes that would be needed to allow Sidewalk Labs to do its thing? I thought that was exhaustive, and yet we seem to be getting a few more examples of rules that need to be changed, some of which seem pretty important:
Permission to apply certain innovative building techniques, including a flexible interior wall system that speeds up construction times and allows spaces to adapt quickly to a variety of uses. (p. 95)
As someone who has been known to enter buildings from time to time, I would like to know why these “innovative building techniques” are not currently legally available to Sidewalk Labs? Are flexible interior walls workable?
Public-private-private partnerships
In addition to potential real estate development partners, Sidewalk Labs anticipates entering into partnerships to facilitate the detailed design, construction, and management of specific elements of the Quayside plan. (p. 94)
I thought this was regionals, or When will we see the final Quayside plan?
“If we win regionals, then it’s straight on to sectionals. And then a week later is semis, then semi-regionals, then regional semis, then national lower-zone semis!” – Mr. Rad, Community
Wasn’t the Master Innovation and Development Plan supposed to be a detailed development plan? What are we even doing here?
Upon approval of the MIDP, Sidewalk Labs would prepare a detailed development plan, an infrastructure and transportation master plan, and a site remediation plan for Quayside, all subject to approval by Waterfront Toronto as spelled out in the Implementation Agreements. (p. 95)
This is getting ridiculous. If Sidewalk Labs, after 18 months and several delays, hasn’t been able to put together an actual detailed plan for the 12 acres it was asked to develop, then Waterfront Toronto should can the whole process and call it a day.
Of course, once the current provisional MIDP is approved, the public loses all of its leverage. We’ll be stuck with Google and a largely unaccountable Waterfront Toronto (or “public administrator”) and whatever changes they want to make to this MIDP, which at the end of the day is more a sales brochure than an actual planning document.
Sidewalk Labs and Waterfront Toronto’s continued insistence that we’re debating an actual plan insults our intelligence. [Note: I wrote this before Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalk Labs announced that their relationship would end if Sidewalk Labs did not address several key issues. In other words, if Sidewalk Labs comes up with an alternate proposal, we have to go through all of this nonsense again. So to repeat, in bold:
If Sidewalk Labs, after 18 months and several delays, hasn’t been able to put together an actual detailed plan for the 12 acres it was asked to develop, then Waterfront Toronto should can the whole process and call it a day.]
The timeline: Good luck with that
For a company that just admitted one paragraph ago that they haven’t finalized their plans for Quayside, plans that would require regulatory changes from governments that follow their own schedules, this timeline is almost charmingly naïve and optimistic:
Sidewalk Labs estimates that construction on a portion of Quayside could commence as early as 2021 and that the entirety of Quayside could be completed by the end of 2026.
And here’s the ask that they were building up toward. Sidewalk Labs offers to “bear the cost of the research and development embedded in the Quayside development program,” which we are informed involves a “higher-than-market costs of the innovation agenda at Quayside.” (p. 96)
Here we go:
In transacting for the Quayside properties, Sidewalk Labs would propose to pay Waterfront Toronto a price that places the cost and risk of the innovation agenda on Sidewalk Labs, while recognizing that Waterfront Toronto would receive some of the value for its land in a direct payment and some by achieving the policy objectives it laid out in the Quayside RFP and prior precinct planning. (p. 96)
It’s a bit odd that Waterfront Toronto seems to be presenting the IDEA District and all its innovation costs as if this is a one-off project. The reason Sidewalk Labs is even in Toronto is because it wants to develop technologies, services and expertise that it can sell to other cities. Toronto is doing Sidewalk Labs a favour, not the other way around. No Toronto, no revenue stream. After all, if you can’t play ball with affable Canadians, how are you going to do elsewhere in the world?
For all Sidewalk Labs’ previous talk of Google’s deep pockets, these don’t seem to be in much evidence in this part of the report. The risk that Sidewalk Labs is taking here will, if it pays off, be spread out over many other city projects.
And anyway, functioning markets determine the most efficient use of resources. If something has “higher-than-market costs” that simply means that there are more efficient ways to spend those resources. If Sidewalk Labs can’t make the numbers work as a for-profit company without asking for a handout, that’s the market’s way of saying that there are better uses of your resources.
Thing is, this doesn’t hold for Sidewalk Labs because Sidewalk Labs isn’t responding to the market; it’s trying to invent the market – that is, a market for smart-city services.
And if you’re a city that wants to do something that doesn’t yield a profit, we already have a solution: fund it out of taxes and get government to do it. There’s a reason so much infrastructure is funded by governments: it’s because building it benefits everyone, and it can be cheaper to build things in the long run if you don’t need to seek a profit, as Sidewalk Labs does.
Long story short, this is a deal that Waterfront Toronto doesn’t have to take. If you’re going to do this plan (and I don’t think they should), charge them full price for the land or send them packing. There is no shortage of companies (many of them Canadian) with smart-city development ideas. Sidewalk Labs needs Toronto more than Toronto needs Sidewalk Labs.
Villiers West urban innovation campus (pp. 98-107)
Proposed home of Google and the Google-linked Urban Innovation Institute.
How it would happen
Upon completion of the Don River Naturalization work, the government would need to combine the parcels proposed for the new campus with parcels owned by the City of Toronto and Ports Toronto. To enable the creation of these new economic development assets and realize the catalytic potential of Villiers West sooner, Sidewalk Labs proposes to execute a land transaction to vertically develop the area, with development partners. (p. 98)
Google campus or go home
Without the addition of the urban innovation campus on Villiers Island, establishing the IDEA District as a vibrant centre of commerce is unlikely. (p. 98)
The land would include Google’s Canada Branch HQ, the Urban Innovation Institute “and a network of mixed-use surrounding spaces.” (p. 100)
Urban Innovation Institute
The Institute is envisioned as an independent, non-profit organization located within the innovation campus. Sidewalk Labs envisions that local academic institutions would collaborate in the design and implementation of the Urban Innovation Institute, which would serve as a centre for applied research, policy development, and skills training. (p. 101)
With Google at its core, it would shape Canadian technological development according to Google’s needs. (see: technology is not neutral)
Question: Who is going to maintain the Urban Innovation Institute’s funding once its seed capital runs out?
Google Village
These parts about housing and social infrastructure around Google’s campus makes it seem like Sidewalk Labs is proposing the construction of a self-contained Google Village. (p. 102) Complete with LRT! (p. 103)
Maybe Sidewalk Labs is running the Google version of Amazon’s HQ2 contest?
The pitch for including Villiers West in the proposal when it wasn’t part of the RFP
Sidewalk Labs finds a 2006 MOU:
Although Villiers West was not specifically identified in the RFP, the city’s 2006 MOU with Waterfront Toronto contemplates circumstances such as this one where an important economic development opportunity arises outside of the context of a traditional request for proposal. In such circumstances, including where a business seeks to move to or establish operations in Toronto, the MOU provides that “flexibility is required.” This reasonably applies to the proposed transaction, which would deliver a major economic development project, bringing a new Google Canadian headquarters and a new applied research institution to Toronto.
Nice to see this new piece of information buried 141 pages from the end of the report. It’s a nice try, but it still doesn’t change the fact that Villiers West and the IDEA District weren’t what was asked for in the RFP and that these additions have happened at the last second. That said, there’s no reason why Sidewalk Labs, or Google proper, couldn’t submit a separate Google Headquarters proposal.
Sidewalk Labs roles in Villiers West
Pretty much the same as Quayside, although as with Quayside, they haven’t ironed out the details:
Upon approval of the MIDP and the relevant Implementation Agreements, Sidewalk Labs would lead a collaborative planning process with Waterfront Toronto, the City of Toronto, Google, and other stakeholders to further advance the creation of a detailed development plan for the campus. This would include further development of the build program, site planning, and design requirements.
Sidewalk Labs would also solicit institutions interested in co-locating with the Urban Innovation Institute and other tenants. Sidewalk Labs is committed to engaging local development partners in the project and, working with Waterfront Toronto, would solicit appropriate partners. Waterfront Toronto would collaborate with Sidewalk Labs in completing the development plan so that it can serve as the basis for approvals and advance the achievement of the IDEA District goals. Waterfront Toronto would also work with the City of Toronto and, if appropriate, Ports Toronto to facilitate the land assemblage (combination of parcels) and to determine the optimal transactional construct. (p. 105)
Land purchase price, along with the evolution of the proposed program, will be negotiated with Waterfront Toronto and its government stakeholders. Sidewalk Labs is committed to fairly compensating Waterfront Toronto and / or the City of Toronto for Villiers West for the acquisition of the land, regardless of the form of the transaction, while reflecting the value Sidewalk Labs will create as an eco- nomic development catalyst.
The proposed transaction would be governed by detailed Implementation Agreements to be developed once the MIDP has been approved. The details of the transaction — including the form of the transaction (such as land-lease versus sale, profit-sharing, joint-venture, or otherwise) and the value of the land — would be incorporated in an Implementation Agreement. (p 106)
Advanced systems (pp. 108-113)
Sidewalk Labs proposes to serve as lead developer of a range of advanced systems for Quayside and Villiers West. (p. 108)
Sidewalk Labs
would play a hands-on role in the early stages of their development and operation. It would prepare designs, identify or partner with operators, and refine and stabilize the operations to achieve efficiency and deliver the promised performance outcomes. (p. 108)
Objectives (pp. 108-109)
Implementation (pp. 112-113)
Pursuant to the [Implementation Agreements that would follow the acceptance of the MIDP], Sidewalk Labs would design, con- struct, procure, and stabilize the operations of the advanced systems. The Implementation Agreements would incorporate various terms and conditions, including specific performance requirements, user-rate constraints, and a requirement of adequate security.
The use of “pursuant” indicates that this is the serious part of the document.
With the exception of the digital communications network (which would be implemented directly by Waterfront Toronto’s broadband internet partner with Sidewalk Labs’ technical advisory support), Sidewalk Labs would be responsible for the following implementation framework for all of the advanced systems, including (emphasis added):
Preparing preliminary designs supple- mental to the ITMP to be used as bridging documents in the form of plans and specifications issued during the procurement of operators for certain systems
Managing the procurement process and selecting operators based on their merits, including qualifications, rate structure, strength of financing, and cost
Providing design and construction oversight
Working with operators to ensure the systems meet the IDEA District objectives
Working alongside the public administrator to ensure that operators maintain an acceptable level of performance
Procurement: Sidewalk Labs would be responsible for procurement decisions, and would have a great deal of leeway in this important area, including the ability to award contracts to itself:
The Implementation Agreements would provide Sidewalk Labs with the flexibility to procure operators that, in its judgment, offer the best solution for Quayside and Villiers West. While relying heavily on joint development agreements with third-party operators, Sidewalk Labs would retain the ability to develop solutions internally, participate in operations, and iterate and adjust those operations. (p. 112)
Question: How to prevent Sidewalk Labs from using its judgment to favour either itself or its fellow Google companies? This language would not constrain it much in this area.
The principles that Sidewalk Labs proposes do little to assuage these concerns:
Sidewalk Labs would seek external partners where available to diversify risk and incorporate expertise from others into the project.
Second, Sidewalk Labs would limit its provision of products and services to situations when its involvement is needed to achieve the necessary outcomes of each system. This means it would not participate in operations where an existing provider is willing and able to deliver the operational approach and performance outcomes and to do so cost effectively.
Third, in its role as Innovation Partner, Sidewalk Labs would transfer knowledge to the public administrator to enable it to take over the advanced systems development role after Quayside and Villiers West. (pp. 112-113)
The problem with these reassurances is that at the end of the day, it would be Sidewalk Labs making the call as to whether it should or shouldn’t act as the sole source contractor. This is a bad governance practice, to say the least.
Sidewalk Labs commits to providing an advanced system or a component it, when “the solution calls for significant iteration or ongoing management after the initial installation.” (I’m not sure how many foundational systems don’t require ongoing management.)
or when
the approach represents a techno- logical solution that has no suitable alternative available in the market based on the method- ology established for classifying purposeful solutions (see Page 123 for more details). (p. 113)
I have a feeling “purposeful solutions” will require some investigation.
If Sidewalk Labs decides it must use a product or service “in which it holds a financial interest,” it must notify the relevant administrator, but it’s still the one that makes the call (p. 113). In such a case, it “may be compen-sated through operating revenue in place of, or in addition to, advanced system development fees, subject to the terms of a master service agreement” (p. 113)
Advanced systems beyond Quayside and Villiers West
If everything works out, the public administrator (WMOMNBWT) would become the lead developer and Sidewalk Labs would support it: “in procuring operators and partners; working with the operators to integrate the systems in the IDEA District to achieve the envisioned technologically enabled outcomes; and working alongside the public administrator to ensure the operators achieve and maintain acceptable performance levels.” (p. 113)
The public administrator (WMOMNBWT) would be responsible for procurement here (assisted by Sidewalk Labs with the preparation of procurement documents, and on refining standards and guidelines), although given the need for interoperability and the fact that Sidewalk Labs would have already set the foundations in place, this power would likely be much less consequential than the procurement power for Quayside and Villiers West.
This has been a lot to read. Thanks for sticking it out.
Our journey continues. This section’s important because it details the regulatory changes Sidewalk Labs wants for its section of the Eastern Waterfront.
You have to love the phrase “targeted regulatory adjustments” (p. 72). For the layperson, this means, changing the laws so that the things that we want to do, which are currently illegal, become legal. Of course, it’s all to support innovation and economic development. Also important: These changes would have to be made by the City, Province and/or federal government.
Some other choice phrases: “A predictable policy environment” (p. 72):
To invest the resources required to achieve the vision laid out in the MIDP and to develop the broader waterfront, Sidewalk Labs, vertical developers, and others operating in the district require certainty that the conditions necessary for success are in place. Advancing this initiative is impossible without a clear understanding of the rules governing the Quayside project or the IDEA District as a whole.
Let’s think through the dishonesty in this brief paragraph. Quayside et al already has a “predictable policy environment”: the bylaws, laws and regulations of the City of Toronto, the Province of Ontario and the Government of Canada. What they don’t have is the laws that Google and Sidewalk Labs want in order to build their dream town.
Then there’s the call for “A responsive regulatory environment” (p. 72), by which they mean the right to be able to do things that would be otherwise not be allowed under current laws.
What else? “Accountability and incentives to match higher demands for performance.” (p. 73) I think this is a request for higher-than-normal payments because they are being asked to do the extraordinary, as well as penalties if targets aren’t being met.
Finally, Sidewalk Labs’ proffered reminder of the importance of “Recognizing the value of scale” serves as the final confirmation (if any was needed) that this is an all-or-nothing proposition. It’s IDEA District or nothing. In a surprising twist, there’s no mention of the appropriate regulatory or governance scale.
Stated more succinctly, Sidewalk Labs is calling for changes to Canadian federal, provincial and municipal laws and regulations to let it and others in its District do things that are not currently allowed under the law. They should receive bonuses for this extra-challenging work, as well as be penalized if they don’t meet specified targets (although I seem to recall that the Request for Proposals suggested that the development partner be responsible for naming the targets).
Also, don’t bother just giving us Quayside. We want all of it, or none of it.
Proposed policies: Introduction (pp. 73-74)
This is the section in which Sidewalk Labs details what laws it would need to have changed so that what it’s planning would be allowable (i.e., legal), as well as those that would be covered by its Innovation Design Standards and Guidelines (IDSG), which I think would act as a type of Municipal Code for the District.
In other words, this is the part where Sidewalk Labs sets out the proposed laws for its neighbourhood.
This section covers the various areas of its innovation framework:
Innovation Framework: Mobility (pp. 74-75)
Related to “dynamic curbs,” exemptions from the Ontario Highway Traffic Act and Toronto’s municipal code, specifically regarding acceptable signage, and from certain parking rules. Would transfer oversight to the WTMA. (p. 74)
Related to “curb pricing” (charges to use curb space): amendment to Ontario’s City of Toronto Act to permit the city to adopt this approach. Toronto would authorize WTMA to manage program and apply funds to IDEA District. (p. 74)
Related to ride hailing: Amend Toronto’s Municipal Code to permit “dynamically shifting areas [for drop-off, pick-up, staging], require drivers to comply with these rules, and empower the WTMA to modify and work with law enforcement to administer them.” (p. 74)
IDSG-covered: increased bike parking and bike lane access or bike priority streets for all new buildings; underground delivery tunnels and a logistics hub,
Innovation Framework: Public Realm (p. 75)
IDSG-covered: Requiring new developments to contribute to open space management.
Innovation Framework: Buildings and Housing (pp. 75-76)
Related to mass-timber buildings, “permission to exceed the six-storey limit on wood construction imposed by the Ontario Building Code and permission to use the Shikkui plaster that is a key aspect of the construction.” (p. 75)
“Sidewalk Labs is actively consulting with the city’s building department and with federal and provincial officials on these specifications.” Some enterprising journalist should follow up with officials to see where this proposal is at, as well as subject experts to see how viable Sidewalk Labs’ plans are.
Noted:
The ultimate ability of mass timber construction to proceed will depend on either provincial legislation to allow such construction in the IDEA District or a determination through the city’s “alternative solutions” process that the construction in Quayside, as described, achieves the same or better level of performance to currently permitted approaches. (p. 76)
Related to “outcome-based, building use system” to increase the number of mixed-use buildings in which regulations would be linked to “use-neutral” categories, “Zoning or Community Planning Permit Bylaws permitting a broader range of uses and incorporating real-time monitoring in the building permitting process.”
IDSG-covered: “Funding below-market housing through a condo resale fee for new developments in the IDEA District”
Building experts: I’m assuming that Sidewalk Labs’ Stoa proposal, and for flexible interior spaces with easily movable walls is currently allowed under Ontario and Toronto rules?
Innovation Framework: Sustainability (pp. 76-78)
Related to its planned “advanced power grid,” “Compensating Toronto Hydro at the regulated rate based upon a campus meter, and then charging customers within the campus at a variable rate, requires approval from the Ontario Energy Board to implement the new rate structure and potentially amend Local Distribution Company regulations to allow a campus approach to electricity.” (p. 77)
Related to its planned stormwater management system, “permission from the city for stormwater systems to encroach into the right of way,” permission to allow “stormwater management infrastructure that serves larger swathes of the IDEA District, rather than mandating a development-by-development approach,” “new developments to fund the new stormwater management infrastructure and its ongoing management in lieu of developing their own more expensive, in-building solutions,” and “an equivalent reduction in the portion of the Toronto Water billing for stormwater.” (p. 77)
IDSG-covered: Requiring new developments to meet heightened sustainability and active energy management requirements; Developing an outcome-based energy code; Connecting to a fossil fuel–free thermal energy solution; Connecting to a pneumatic waste system (pp. 77-78)
Innovation Framework: Social Infrastructure (pp. 78-79)
Related to “healthy urban design and construction requirements for new developments,” “advance existing healthy urban design guidelines and require adherence by new developments.” (p. 78; doesn’t really seem to require any legal changes)
Related to “Requiring all new developments to advance health, education, and civic engagement through proactive planning,” “New developments would need to describe how they align with district-wide community service and facility plans prepared by the city, and detail their specific contributions to establishing healthy communities; creating connected, civically engaged communities; and promoting lifelong learning.” (p. 78; doesn’t really seem to require any legal changes)
Related to “Incorporating space for health facilities in new development plans,” “the administrator [WMOMNB…] would work closely with these bodies to integrate health care service and facility planning into future Precinct Plans for the IDEA District and would explore opportunities to incorporate appropriate, flexible spaces for delivering health care services in new developments if deemed a priority by the province.” (p. 78; doesn’t really seem to require any legal changes, but does make it sound like a level of government co-equal to a city)
Related to “Requiring new developments to prioritize community benefits in construction,” “First, new developments would be required to commit to training, apprenticeships, and jobs for members of historically disadvantaged groups, at minimum participation thresholds (equivalent to 10 percent of all construction labour hours, where applicable). Second, new developments would be required to commit to directing a minimum percentage of project costs to diverse suppliers, small businesses, and social enterprises. Third, during planning and construction, development leads would be required to meet quarterly with a working group of community members and representatives from government agencies to report on progress towards achieving these goals.” (p. 79, again, doesn’t seem to require legal changes)
Related to “Establishing sustainable funding for a non- profit neighbourhood association,” would give the administrator (WMOMNBWT) ability to set user fees or “sustaining contributions from area businesses,” which sounds suspiciously what the olds used to call a “tax.” (p. 79)
Innovation Framework: Digital Innovation
Related to the Urban Data Trust, “Compliance with UDT requirements would be enforceable by contract initially, with a view to a long-term solution that may include transforming the UDT into a public sector or quasi-public sector agency. Public sector entities may need certain exceptions from those requirements where acting in the public interest, such as in an emergency or other urgent situation.” (p. 79)
Part 3: IDEA District Component 3: Financing (pp. 80-81)
IDEA District administrator given fee-setting power
One of the things that stuck with me from The Power Broker, Robert Caro’s masterful account of the rise and fall of New York City’s legendary planner Robert Moses, is how Moses, an unelected official, was able to use his access to toll money from a quasi-independent agency he set up, to effectively make himself independent from the City. The ability to raise and use funds was one of the main foundations of his power, which, in Caro’s definitive telling, almost wrecked New York. (His mega-planning ideals were also behind the failed Spadina Expressway, which was fought in part by a transplanted New Yorker and Moses foe Jane Jacobs.)
In this section, Sidewalk Labs proposes giving the public administrator (WMOMNBWT) similar financial independence. It argues that “the public administrator should receive the authority to employ at least three typical value capture strategies”:
City fee and development charge credits, municipal infrastructure contributions, and local infrastructure contributions;
Land proceeds reinvestment; and
An incremental property tax.
This proposal would give whatever ends up controlling the area the power to raise and spend fees. These are government powers.
The question to ask here is, how accountable would this “Public administrator” be to the electorate under this scenario? If Moses’ example is anything to go by, the answer is, not at all. Money is power, and Sidewalk Labs’ proposal would set up the district to have a power base – the ability to raise and spend money – independent of the rest of the city, province or country. It would become that much harder to control.
Achieving this type of independence is a lot of heavy lifting for two pages, buried deep in the final volume of a nearly 1,500-page report.
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