The New Knowledge: We dropped a classic today

My new book, with Natasha Tusikov, The New Knowledge: Information, Data and the Remaking of Global Power is out today, via Rowman & Littlefield. It’s available for free as an open-access download (thank you, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada!), so please do check it out.

If you’re an instructor, we’d be more than happy to talk with your class about our book and the issues it discusses. I can be reached at bhaggart at brocku dot ca.

On that note, a bit on the book itself.

What it’s about

We’re both very happy with the way The New Knowledge turned out. It’s the culmination of work the two of us have been doing, together and apart, for the past seven years. These include ideas that we workshopped in our two co-edited volumes, Information, Technology and Control in a Changing World: Understanding Power Structures in the 21st Century(with Kathryn Henne, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019) and Power and Authority in Internet Governance: Return of the State? (with Jan Aart Scholte, Routledge, 2021). It also draws on our close reading of Sidewalk Labs and Waterfront Toronto’s failed attempt to build a smart neighbourhood in Toronto, which serves as the book’s leitmotif.

The New Knowledge unpacks the transformative implications of the rising centrality of the control of knowledge – particularly data and intellectual property – for the exercise of economic, social and political power. Put another way, no matter what field you’re working in, or what you do, pretty much every policy and activity has a data and IP – a knowledge – component. We’re negotiating trade agreements that are no longer about physical trade, but regulating knowledge flows (chapter 3) – agreements that are now more about regulating global production/value chains than international trade (also chapter 3). Companies that previously would have been seen as lowly IT providers are inserting themselves (and being welcomed) into all parts of society based on their ability to collect and analyze data (chapters 5 and 6). Property relations are being redefined, with the Internet of Things placing de facto control over connected devices with the supplier, not the nominal owner (chapter 7). The state, meanwhile, is as enamored of data and algorithms as everyone else, and is as ready to buy into its magical properties as anyone.

Understanding this transformation is a vital necessity for everyone. And while there are many who have been working on data and IP issues for a long time – many of whom we cite in this book – many people (including academics and policymakers) are coming across them for the first time. This book is for all those who want to break through the mysteriousness and opacity that often accompanies discussions of data and IP, which has only gotten worse in the current Artificial Intelligence mania.

And so we have two chapters devoted to demystifying knowledge (chapter 2) and data (chapter 4), written for those who would rather not wade through the deliberately murky musings of dense French philosophers. It’s our hope that these chapters will help to inoculate readers against those who ask us to trust in the data and the algorithm – to trust in AI, say – as if these were something magical and above human biases and fallibilities. The promise of AI, of data, of algorithms, is the promise of neutral knowledge unsullied by human prejudice, ignorance and bias. It’s a false promise, as scholars have known for decades, and as we highlight here. The reality is, you can never escape people. Once you have a firm grasp of what data is, that it’s people all the way down, it’s hard to take the claims of AI evangelists seriously.

The Power of Belief

The theme of belief in data, IP and algorithms recurs throughout the book. We argue that the defining characteristic of our current knowledge-driven society isn’t technological, but rather the belief that commodified knowledge – data and IP – is a superior form of knowledge. As we unpack in Chapter 5, this belief, and the privileging of commodified knowledge (and the people who claim mastery over its collection and analysis), is only partially related to global digitization and the internet. It is this belief that convinces urban-development experts, say, that a search engine and advertising company has the capacity to plan and build a city. Or that we should listen to computer scientists who claim to have invented god, and not just a glorified autocomplete machine.

Power and Control

The ability to control these socially valuable forms of knowledge (or, rather, forms of knowledge believed to be socially valuable) has allowed certain actors – namely the large (mostly) American “platforms” – to play dominant roles throughout the economy and society. Want to understand what Meta and Google are up to in the C-18 tug-of-war? Our book outlines how these companies are systematically working to make themselves central de facto governors over our lives, whether as two-sided markets or as standards-setters (chapter 6).

Nothing New

The belief that the challenges posed by AI, by algorithms, by platforms, by the internet are all new, and require novel responses, is the biggest challenge to addressing these challenges. Shoshana Zuboff put forward her book The Age of Surveillance Capitalism as an attempt to fill what she called a void, a “tabula rasa” that required novel responses to “unprecedented” challenges.

Not only does Zuboff do a disservice by effectively erasing the myriad scholars who have been working for decades on the specific issues she identifies, but she’s flat-out wrong in claiming that these are unprecedented challenges.

Theory is the scaffolding of an argument. In The New Knowledge, our scaffolding was provided by three International Political Economy scholars in particular: Susan Strange, Robert Cox and Karl Polanyi (chapters 2 and 3). I won’t go into the details here (read the book!), but importantly, all three of them made their primary theoretical contribution before the mainstreaming of the internet (1980s for Strange and Cox, 1940s(!) for Polanyi), and were not primarily focused on data, intellectual property or related issues. The mark of a good theory is its applicability beyond the situation or era in which it was first proposed, and these three more than fit the mark. Most importantly, our successful application of these three theorists to what we call the knowledge-driven society suggests that if existing theories can be used to understand our current moment, existing policy solutions are also available to us. No need to reinvent the wheel.

(This isn’t to say that we simply apply their work unchanged. We do propose reinterpretations of all three, but in a way that solves puzzles posed by their own formulations while maintaining the essence of their own theories. That is our theoretical contribution to our understanding of International Political Economy.)

That said, we also draw on the work of two other, more contemporary, theorists, José van Dijck (for her concept of dataism) and Evgeny Morozov (for his concept of technological solutionism), who better than most understand the ideological orientation of our current age.

Knowledge Feudalism, Digital Economic Nationalism and … a third option

As interested as we are in theory, and as important as it is to describe and understand our current moment, we also have a strong, pragmatic interest in policy, a byproduct of our pre-academia years spent working in various capacities for the Canadian federal government. We identify two dominant policy approaches to the knowledge-driven society. The first is knowledge feudalism. This is the dominant player’s strategy: if you already control significant amounts of economically and socially valuable knowledge (and the mans to disseminate and analyze it), then you’ll want to ensure that others pay to play. This is the strategy of the US and its companies (e.g., Meta, Google).

Challengers, seeking access to such knowledge, will be more open to cooperation, more-open data and IP flows, and state intervention (the state being the only actor capable of going toe-to-toe with US and Chinese corporate champions). We call this Digital Economic Nationalism. And while it’s seen as more benign than US Knowledge Feudalism, its end goal remains domination of others. This is one reason why, in the book, we are relatively critical of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): it may have some good points to it, but it’s designed around European interests and European values, not those of other countries, to whom the EU presents itself as a “regulatory superpower” (chapter 8).

While we acknowledge that Digital Economic Nationalism is a logical response to knowledge feudalism (and shouldn’t be seen as akin to mercantilist protectionism (chapter 3)), it fails to get rid of the oppressive power dynamics created by the knowledge/data/IP-driven society. And so, in Chapter 9 and the Conclusion, we propose a policy of decommodification. Drawing on concepts of data justice, group (as opposed to individual) privacy, Indigenous data sovereignty, the practical work on Barcelona’s smart city and Karl Polanyi’s analysis of fictitious commodities (data and IP being fictitious commodities), we argue that data and knowledge commodified by intellectual property laws must be seen first and foremost not as commodities to be repurposed at the whims of others. This approach to data mirrors how other fictitious commodities are treated. Labour and environmental regulations, and bankruptcy laws, are all designed to limit the marketization of things that are essential to human and social functioning. That’s the direction we need to head with data and IP laws. (And AI laws, which are functionally equivalent to data laws.)

Instead, the context within which data and knowledge is generated must be respected, with the people who serve as the source of this knowledge, and who will be acted upon using this knowledge, given control over how their data and knowledge will be used. Almost all problems in the data- and knowledge-driven economy are the result of knowledge appropriated away from these individuals and groups: it’s not a problem when a user sends their data to Google Maps to get from Point A to Point B; it is a problem when that data is sold to insurance companies and ends up being used to increase an identified group’s insurance rates, or deny them insurance altogether.

A note on ChatGPT and clarity of thought

Readers will note that, in contrast to the avalanche of words that has accompanied the November 2022 release of ChatGPT, the book is somewhat light on mentions of ChatGPT, large language models and “artificial intelligence.” We would invite the reader to see this as a feature, not a bug. As we note in the book, “artificial intelligence” is a term with many different sets of meanings. It’s also a term that current overuse has degraded to the point to meaninglessness. When writing the book, we made a point to avoid using the term, preferring instead to focus on precise concepts, such as “predictive algorithms” or “algorithmic regulation.” We intentionally burrowed down to the fundamental concepts at play, namely data, knowledge, algorithms, and the perceptions of these. It is our hope that focusing clearly on these underlying concepts – which are equally applicable to the AI debate in 2023 as they were in 2022 – will help readers cut through the AI froth, to focus on the ideas and concepts that truly matter.

With all that out of the way, here’s the Run the Jewels song that served as the inspiration for this post’s title.

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No Longer Liveblogging Sidewalk Labs’ MIDP, entry 12: The Master Plan: I Have Some Notes

Last Friday, I attended a preview performance of The Master Plan, a play about the Sidewalk Labs-Waterfront Toronto Quayside debacle. The evening, which was hosted by Jim Balsillie, one of the higher-profile opponents of the Quayside project, served as a reunion of sorts for many of the (many) critics who opposed the project.

The gathering was long overdue: because Sidewalk Labs abandoned the project at the beginning of the pandemic, in May 2020, the activists who had spent three years of their lives fighting this deal never had the chance to celebrate in person.

It felt like a reunion. Since I’m based down the road in St. Catharines, and because I was primarily involved via this blog and other public writing on the project, it was a chance to meet for the first time many of the people whose names I recognized from news reports, blog posts and Twitter activism. It was a delight, the mood valedictory.

As for the main attraction, well, I have some notes.

The Master Plan does a lot of things very right. Its staging and use of video screens are excellent and fit the story perfectly. Mike Shara as Sidewalk Labs CEO Dan Doctoroff is a force of nature, his character perfectly written. That he didn’t have the opportunity to receive a final applause break during the play itself (his final “appearance” occurs off-stage) was a shame. The other actors do well in their (necessarily) less-flashy parts. The play adeptly covers two-plus years of craziness, and at 2.5 hours with one intermission, it never drags.

It’s also very funny. I laughed throughout, not least because of my intimate familiarity with every angle of the play. When they finally revealed The Master Plan (aka the Master Innovation and Development Plan), my laughter was definitely cathartic. One cannot emerge unscathed from devoting an entire a working month (Monday-Friday; I took a day off for my birthday) deciphering a document that was designed to be seen, not read. I imagine the rest of the audience, many of whom spent three full years being dismissed, ignored and lied to, felt much the same way.

While it was definitely a hit in the room, I don’t know how an audience unversed in the intricacies of Quayside bureaucratic infighting will take to it.

And, on reflection, I’m not sure how well it hangs together as a play. It gets the details right but the story wrong, both as a coherent work of fiction (on its own terms) and as an argument about what actually happened.

Waterfront Toronto’s lack of agency

Its biggest problem is that while playwright Michael Healey, working from Josh O’Kane’s book, Sideways: The City Google Couldn’t Buy, has a very good grasp on Doctoroff and Sidewalk Labs, his portrayal of Waterfront Toronto, in the characters of Kristina Verner and Meg Davis (fictionalized but based on real people), is surprisingly inert. In the context of the play, Sidewalk Labs is something that just happens to them. They have no agency. They simply react to the latest weird thing that Sidewalk Labs does, without really considering deeply own roles, and the ongoing role of the company they work for, in contributing to their own misery. Without that second half, the satire loses a lot of its bite.

All fault on Waterfront Toronto’s side is placed on the head of the bumbling, out-of-his-depth CEO Will Fleissig – resembling no one so much as Jack Lemmon’s take on Glengarry Glen Ross’s Shelley Levine – and to a lesser extent, members of the Waterfront Toronto board who won’t let our brave head bureaucrats talk to the public. (The play at times seems to posit that the biggest problem with Quayside was its comms plan.) They are presented as our heroes, the ones who just want to provide environmentally sustainable housing for Torontonians.

This pose, though, only works (in the play and in real life) if there was even the slightest chance that Google/Sidewalk Labs could deliver on its promises. But as I detailed in my month of blog posts on the MIDP, success was never on the table. This was never going to work, because Sidewalk Labs had no experience in building a neighbourhood and no workable plan for constructing anything on Quayside’s 12 acres. That they were, in the play’s words, “clowns” is made very clear throughout. In the beginning of the play, Doctoroff effectively says that the company had done nothing of consequence. In the end, the MIDP, their Master Plan, is revealed (correctly) to be a steaming pile of overreaching nonsense.

But Sidewalk Labs isn’t just something that happened to Waterfront Toronto, in the play or in real life. Sidewalk Labs, in the play, is a force of nature, the vampire that needs to be invited in to cause chaos. But it was Waterfront Toronto that set everything in motion, and was complicit in keeping things moving right up until the very end.

Waterfront Toronto, and its staff, drafted a flawed RFP. Waterfront Toronto continued to negotiate with Sidewalk Labs after it became manifestly clear that they were a bad actor incapable of playing straight with anyone.

Very little is made, for example, of the insinuation in the play that the only reason Sidewalk Labs was awarded the project over an infinitely more experienced and capable Siemens was because Sidewalk Labs was willing to pony up $50 million to undertake the initial planning. It reminds me of a perhaps apocryphal story about how the most convincing thing about the Ottawa Senators’ 1992 expansion bid was simply that it had $50 million to give to the NHL.

In the play, up to the very last minute, Waterfront Toronto is looking for loopholes that will allow Sidewalk Labs to stay on the project, despite literally no proof that Sidewalk Labs could be trusted on anything.

At the very least, there’s a lot one could unpack about the constant bad decisions that Waterfront Toronto itself made. Waterfront Toronto, including its staff, were active participants in their own misfortune. Unfortunately, its motivations, including that it’s facing a decision on its renewal as a corporation, are never seriously unpacked in the play.

Instead, the overall impression of Waterfront Toronto is of an entity concerned solely with doing the right thing, especially for the environment, which, as in Sidewalk Labs’ promotional materials, gets trotted out every now and then to burnish their bona fides.

The real enemies: Pesky activists and faceless bureaucrats

In making Waterfront Toronto the heroes, the play commits to a surprising choice of villains. Probably the most fascinating thing about the play is its rock-bottom opinion of the public, the activists who kept trying to bring some accountability to Waterfront Toronto, a highly unaccountable organization (being a tripartite quasi-governmental organization, residents and citizens have no direct way to influence its decisions) over an obviously bad deal.

The play has a very strong opinion about whether the public should be involved: basically, no, not at all. If Sidewalk Labs is a force of nature, the two main villains in Healey’s play are the public and City of Toronto bureaucrats.

It’s weird.

What makes it particularly strange is that the play’s argument, which surfaces mostly in the second half, is not supported by the play itself.

Anti-Quayside activists do not come off well at all in this play. Public opposition to Quayside is presented as a bunch of misinformation-driven NIMBYism.

The play illustrates this point with a Jon Stewart-esque takedown of the many media outlets and activists who used this quote from Alphabet CEO Eric Schmidt: “We started talking about all of these things that we could do if someone would just give us a city and put us in charge,” without reporting the rest of the quote: “For all sorts of good reasons, by the way, it doesn’t work that way.”

Schmidt, you see, was just joking! And paranoid, biased activists refused to recognize the joke. Paying attention only to the first part, they sowed misinformation and needless fear about Quayside, raising unfounded questions about Google’s and Sidewalk Labs’ bona fides.

Having DESTROYED these ignorant activists, the play gets back to the real heroes, the good folks at Waterfront Toronto who are pushing back against this misinformation to get the Sidewalk Labs deal across the finish line. For climate change. And stuff.

Remember that saying, Many a true word is spoken in jest? Healey’s play apparently doesn’t.  

As an audience member, to say nothing of someone who watched this nonsense unfold in real time, this supposed dunk was incredibly frustrating because it contradicts practically everything that happens in the play. Doctoroff spends literally every second of stage time running roughshod over Waterfront Toronto. In the play, Doctoroff’s final speech (brilliantly delivered) is nothing less than a plan to create a self-funded entity within the City of Toronto. He practically says, Here are the things we will do when someone gives us a city and puts us in charge.

Going into the project, they thought that Waterfront Toronto had more autonomy than it did, kind of like the Triborough Bridge Authority in New York, whose self-financing was the foundation for Robert Moses’ autocratic powers. Back in Toronto, as I detailed in my examination of the MIDP, Sidewalk Labs wanted to create several management entities with themselves at the centre. Even within the universe of the play, the assertion that Google thought it shouldn’t be put in charge of a city makes no sense whatsoever.

The activists – we – were right to be suspicious of Google. Their – our – analyses has been vindicated, both by reality and within the play.

To repeat: The activists were RIGHT. About Schmidt’s quote, and in their suspicion of the project.

(As was Mariana Valverde’s, one of the few academics to speak out publicly against the Quayside project, including in peer-reviewed and academic articles, raising among other things, relevant questions about the project’s governance structure. She deserves better than to have her work dismissed by O’Kane (p. 233) as a “University of Toronto law professor [she’s actually a criminologist] who was writing sharp-tongued screeds about how governance oversights could cause trouble at Quayside.”)

It’s kind of hard to follow the play’s logic. Toronto City Hall is being run by pedantic bureaucrats who won’t let Torontonians have nice things, the nice things here being Sidewalk Labs’ plans. They’re responsible for thwarting Waterfront Toronto, an organization run by unaccountable bureaucrats, that is doing business with a company, Sidewalk Labs, which has demonstrated time and again that it can’t be trusted.

I might be a tool of Big Bureaucrat, but if I were a Toronto employee, I’d be very suspicious of the entire thing, too.

And yet the play ends with a condemnation of Toronto’s culture, city hall, and anti-Quayside activists as the faceless forces thwarting Sidewalk Labs’ desire to fight climate change. And not, say, with a condemnation of Waterfront Toronto for wasting three years of everyone’s time by getting into bed with a company that was obviously from day one not up to the task. Time that could have actually been spent addressing climate change. Would working with Sidewalk Labs really have helped move the needle on anything? Where would you look for evidence to prove that assertion?

(Stepping outside the play for a moment, the play quickly dismisses surveillance concerns as a nothingburger. But as we’ve seen with Google’s DeepMind, Google can easily bring supposedly independent entities in-house, changing the rules on how data is used. And if you think Google is just interested in data for advertising, let’s chat about a little something called AI. Plus, once you’re hooked into a company’s tech, it becomes hard to change horses. This type of power is not really on the play’s radar, though.)

Sidewalk Labs and the dream of success

Which brings us to another structural problem: the play begins, and ends, on a note that suggests that Sidewalk Labs could actually do all the things it says it wants to do. Healey creates a composite character to reflect the optimistic part of Sidewalk Labs’ mission: that they would solve homelessness, climate change and much else. Presented in a sympathetic light, this character, along with Verner’s and Davis’s paeans to fighting climate change, speak to the heart of the play’s argument, that the Quayside project was undone because of narrow-minded Toronto NIMBYism and the intransigent, faceless, overly powerful bureaucrats who run City Hall like low-rent Illuminati.

This conclusion is at least partially true to O’Kane’s source material, which ends on a note of cautious optimism about what could have been:

If implemented carefully, many of Sidewalk Labs’ individual ideas for Toronto could have changed countless lives for the better. Though few of its ideas were truly new, they had rarely been sold in such a lucrative-looking package, and could have set new standards around the world for energy-efficient buildings, home ownership models, garbage reduction and, eventually, maybe neighbourhoods destined for self-driving cars. Sidewalk hired dozens of employees who brushed aside all the drama the company courted and really tried to make these things happen. But Sidewalk bid for a project from a relatively unknown public agency in a city it didn’t know well that was asking for innovation it couldn’t really define. And Dan Doctoroff built a company that couldn’t stop sabotaging its own great ideas, repeatedly asking for more than anyone could offer it – against the advice of the agency he partnered with, the city he wanted to work in and even the people he courted for support. Sidewalk Labs wanted to win so badly that it just kept losing.

“If implemented carefully,” does a lot of heavy lifting in that paragraph. It assumes that a company whose main calling card, as mentioned in the play, were street-based internet kiosks that delivered porn al fresco to New Yorkers, was actually capable of delivering everything that they promised. And they promised everything.

Putting aside the unsupportable hyperbole of “countless lives,” in the play as in life actually existing Sidewalk Labs – the inexperienced tech start-up that Waterfront Toronto foolishly got into bed with – never demonstrated the capacity to pull off any projects at the scale of the neighbourhood.

Literally everything they said and did indicated the opposite, in the play as in reality. Sidewalk Labs gave us no reason to believe that they could deliver on any of the things they promised. Like so much of what passes for innovation in Silicon Valley, they were selling a form of technological solutionism that was more focused on creating markets for technology than actually addressing climate change. Then again, that’s just something that we egghead academics have been researching and writing screeds about for over a decade now.

As for Waterfront Toronto, at the end of the day they were saved from being tied to a company of “clowns” (to quote the play), not by any decisive move on their part, but by Sidewalk Labs walking away in May 2020. From the play’s Sidewalk Labs’ urban-development composite character:

I used to go to bed at night praying you wouldn’t notice we were clowns until there was a hole in the ground. We had unserious leadership – we were a fucking mess – yes. We were clowns. But we came here not knowing that NIMBYism is a way of life here. It’s bigger than ice hockey [NOTE: I’m pretty sure Americans just call it “hockey”]. You might have warned us.

I guess the question is: Why are we fucking around like this? [Then he mentions a whole slew of problems, including the climate crisis] So yes, late [in addressing these issues] and yes, clowns, but it would have been a start? Our thing wouldn’t have fixed anything, but it would have been a step?

Clown-delivered public policy

I mean, what do you do with a speech like that? Especially since a Waterfront Toronto employee reacts by giving him a hug, as if she, a representative of the company that kicked off this rolling disaster, can offer some form of commiseration.

Because the answer is, clowns by definition do not offer a start, or a step, on anything but clowning. Just having good intentions isn’t enough if you’re incompetent. When your play steps out of itself to criticize the very people who were pointing out that these people were clowns, you don’t really have a grasp on your subject. People have a right to object to stupid ideas, and the Quayside smart city was full of stupid ideas, from a poorly worded RFP to selecting Sidewalk Labs as a partner, richly deserving in public outrage.

Not nearly enough (by which I mean nothing) is made of the fact that Waterfront Toronto wasted three years of its time working with a company that could never have been a good partner, or vendor. Hoping that your partner agency doesn’t notice that you’re a clown isn’t a business strategy; it’s a con, a scam.

This wasn’t the public’s fault. It wasn’t the fault of culture. Or Bianca Wylie. Or Julie DiLorenzo. Or Doug Ford. Or faceless Toronto bureaucrats. Or any of the other enemies the play posits. Waterfront Toronto wasted everyone’s time.

Consider that, in the play, Waterfront Toronto was willing to concede a piece of public land to keep Sidewalk Labs, a company with no track record, and that had consistently tried to screw Waterfront Toronto over, involved in this project. After watching this play for 2.5 hours, how is the audience member supposed to react? Waterfront Toronto doing what they have to do to get the job done? With this company? A cynic might see these actions as those of a company that, even knowing that Sidewalk Labs could not be trusted, was willing to sacrifice the public interest for its own interest, to save face and preserve its mandate. In the scope of what we’d just been shown in the play, this reading is, at the very least, a fair and plausible one.

But as I said, the play treats Sidewalk Labs as something that happened to Waterfront Toronto, not something that Waterfront Toronto did, and continued to do, to itself and to Toronto.

To say that Sidewalk Labs, or Waterfront Toronto, had some good people working for them, who wanted to do good and be good, is beside the point. It is only as employees of the company or the organization that they are able to conduct their business. An urban developer who works for Google is a Google employee.

Trying to follow the logic

These kinds of thematic inconsistencies recur throughout the play. The attacks on City Hall felt less true to the events of the play and more like an unconnected gripe that’s been bugging the playwright for a while. I’ve no doubt that Toronto bureaucracy can be silly and inflexible. But would it have been better for the City and Waterfront Toronto to partner with Sidewalk Labs? After everything we learned about them, of which the play only scratched the surface? Or for Waterfront Toronto to have more independence? Is the lesson really that the public should have just trusted Waterfront Toronto to do the right thing? And given that they are even less accountable than City Hall civil servants, on what grounds do they deserve our trust? Because they want to do good in the world? You don’t think those awful City Hall bureaucrats believe the same of themselves?

In its dismissive treatment of the activists who raised their voices on Quayside, the play ends up championing Waterfront Toronto’s bureaucrats who, being part of a quasi-government authority, are even more isolated from public pressure than Toronto’s. And, frankly, in a play whose heroes are supposed to be so concerned about climate change, it’s a weird look to illustrate the unchecked power of your enemy – the Toronto bureaucratic Illuminati – by highlighting how difficult it is for Toronto homeowners to chop down trees whenever they feel like it.

But that’s the play in a nutshell: confused on themes, with a predetermined conclusion that doesn’t fit the evidence it presents. Data, intellectual property, technological solutionism and private power – the very heart of the challenges in regulating the smart city, and the heart of the opposition to Quayside – don’t really feature in this play. If you don’t think these are important, maybe it’s easier to see opposition to this type of project as simply garden-variety NIMBYism. But you may also not fully understand what you’re actually looking at.

In Doctoroff and Sidewalk Labs, The Master Plan has one half of a great satire. Widening its target to include not just the vampire, but the organization (Waterfront Toronto) that invited the vampire in would make for a more honest, and more compelling, story.

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New (co-written) from me: The Canadian government’s poor track record on public consultations undermines its ability to regulate new technologies

Over at The Conversation, co-written with Natasha Tusikov. In which we express our ongoing frustration with what, at this point, can only be described as the federal government’s refusal to conduct meaningful public consultations on data-governance issues. The government’s just-announced decision to hold a dead-of-summer, month-long, invitation-only consultations (industry, academics, civil society) toward a voluntary code for generative AI is only the latest example of an antipathy to fulsome consultations that stretches back to 2018, affecting everything from the digital economy to online harms and now privacy, data governance and (how I dislike the term) artificial intelligence:

The lack of effective consultation is particularly egregious given the novelty and controversy surrounding generative AI, the technology that burst into public consciousness last year with the unveiling of OpenAI’s ChatGPT chatbot.

Limited stakeholder consultations are not appropriate when there exists, as is the case with generative AI, a dramatic lack of consensus regarding its potential benefits and harms.

As Natasha and I have noted many times before, including in this piece in 2018, running a sound consultation isn’t rocket science: direct a public conversation about the issue, build a foundation of knowledge among the public and policymakers. Then you propose legislation and ask for feedback based on the information base you’d established in the initial consultation.

What shouldn’t you do? Hold a consultation at the very time when every sensible person is on vacation, treat a fuzzy issue that implicates interests across the society as a technical issue, and invite in the industries you want to regulate (or ask to sign off on a voluntary code), and which have caused this mess in the first place, to participate in setting the rules.

These are not the actions of a government that takes sound public policymaking seriously:

Government regulation is both legitimate and necessary to address issues like online harms, data protection and preserving Canadian culture. But the Canadian government’s deliberate hobbling of its consultation processes is hurting its regulatory agenda and its ability to give Canadians the regulatory framework we need.

The federal government needs to engage in substantive consultations to help Canadians understand and regulate artificial intelligence, and the digital sphere in general, in the public interest.

Check out the whole piece over at The Conversation. And enjoy this photo of a Lake Ontario laker.

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Some thoughts on platform governance and Bill C-18 (The Online News Act)

Wrote this up on Twitter (y’all know what I’m talking about, so no need to call it something else), reposting it here. Basically calling for critics to engage with the past decade (and longer) of literature on platform governance, especially regarding platform power, platforms as infrastructure and platform non-neutrality.

If I weren’t in the middle of a million other things, I’d have provided links to what I mean by the “platform governance literature,” but basically you can start with Tarleton Gillespie’s foundational 2010 article, Robert Gorwa’s “What is Platform Governance?” Natasha Tusikov’s 2016 book Chokepoints: Global Private Regulation on the Internet (which has so much to say on the regulatory push-and-pull between macrointermediaries (i.e., platforms) and governments), Nick Srnicek’s Platform Capitalism, my 2020 article, “Global platform governance and the internet-governance impossibility theorem”, and Natasha’s and my latest book, The New Knowledge: Information, Data and the Remaking of Global Power. And on the Australian case, it would be nice if critics would at least refer to the positive review it’s gotten from the Australian Treasury, either to trash it or praise it.

Meta’s arguments justifying its blocking of Canadian news media (and @TheBeaverton?) rely on an outdated view of “platforms” as neutral conduits, one-way providers of value to its voluntary users. They’re not, and never have been. #C18 #platformgovernance

I read critiques of C-18 that blame the government for Meta’s *choice* to block Canadian media and it’s immediately clear that too many critics have not engaged with a decade of platform governance literature.

Including how platforms’ goal is to create monopolies. Their goal is to become indispensable infrastructure. Their goal is to attack democratic governments’ ability to regulate (US and EU excluded). All of which are in play here and which complicate the gov’t bad-Meta good POV.

On platform neutrality: in reality, both intermediaries and news media create value. This value is social *and* economic. They are all part of our information ecosystem. Platforms are not neutral. Their actions (algorithms, advertising monopoly) affect others.

Meta and Google have not been good stewards of this ecosystem, be it their ad-driven search degradation or fomenting an actual genocide (Facebook, Rohingya). It’s not insane to require them to pay to support the ecosystem into which they’ve inserted themselves.

It’s disingenuous to argue that by blocking Canadian media Meta’s just following the law, making themselves a non-news intermediary. They have spent the past decade selling themselves as indispensable media infrastructure. Remember the (falsehood-driven) Pivot to Video?

What’s happening: these companies spent a decade positioning themselves as indispensable media infrastructure. (And infrastructure that shouldn’t be regulated. Because the Internet.) Tempted by the platforms, including by their lies (e.g., pivot to video), media jumped on board.

Google and Meta spent money on individual deals w media cos to forestall regulation. Why? B/c mandatory bargaining, eg as found in C-18, would remove their power over media companies. They could no longer decide who gets what money and on what terms.

Now, having established their position as essential media infrastructure, they’re cashing in their chips and attempting to tell us who’s boss.

C-18 BTW, is an advance over the Australian model, where (secret) negotiation can happen outside their Code, at the platforms’ discretion. C-18 is fairer and more democratic.

This isn’t about money, or paying a “fair” amount. These very profitable companies will throw around money if they feel like it. This is about power. Specifically, platform power to refuse to be governed by democratic parliaments.

The principle at stake isn’t free information flows. We know (again the scholarship has moved on from early 2000s internet libertarianism) that information quality matters as much as the flow of this information. Free flows don’t matter much if the flows are garbage.

To be clear, for all its flaws, the regulatory coverage and transparency aspects of the bill are things to be celebrated. Transparency, accountability are good, democratic values. These are what Meta and Google, and their defenders, are stomping on. It’s bizarre.

If anything, the government erred in taking too soft a line with the platforms, leaving it up to them to negotiate deals. We now know that this sign of respect for their autonomy was seen as an attack. The gov’t should have been more hard-nosed from the beginning.

This fight, again, is not about money or fairness. It’s about platforms rejecting the right of governments to regulate platforms. Which means that this was a fight that we were going to have one way or another. Cold comfort for Canadian media, but there you are.

Which means that the only way out is through. Governments were always going to have to take on platform power. The best that can be said now is that governments should stop operating under the illusion that these platforms are in any way neutral. They’re anti-democratic rivals.

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Blackmail as corporate power play: Some thoughts on the Google/Meta C-18 tantrum

Interrupting my July vacation to highlight some points regarding Meta and Google’s high-stakes game of chicken with the Canadian government over Bill C-18.

1. This is not about money. It’s about power. I see that Michael Geist is arguing that Meta’s and Google’s decision to remove Canadian news providers is based on economic considerations, that “news links” (what most people just call “news”) isn’t economically valuable enough to justify them allowing Canadian news services on their networks. And similarly, that “economic circumstances” have changed, and these companies don’t have as much ready cash as they did in the good ol’ days.

The tell that Google and Meta’s actions aren’t being driven by economic considerations is that Google has run this play before. Not in Australia, but in Spain, which Google News abandoned in 2014, when the government passed a law requiring news aggregators to pay a licensing fee for posting headline snippets. They only returned last year, following a modification of the law, which allows … wait for it … “media outlets to negotiate directly with the tech giant.”

Google and Meta aren’t objecting to the price, or a free and open internet. They simply don’t want to be told what to do.

This is a fight over structural power, and who gets to exercise it: tech macrointermediaries (a more accurate term than “platform”) or democratically elected governments. The term “structural power” – which refers to the ability to set the rules and norms under which others operate – doesn’t show up in these debates very often, but it’s key to understanding these clashes between platforms and governments.

And this isn’t just any fight over structural power. As the foundational International Political Economy scholar Susan Strange recognized, the power to control the legitimation, creation, dissemination and use of knowledge is a fundamental form of power in society. In other words, this is a fight about the very principle that sovereign, democratically elected governments have the legitimate right to pass and enforce laws regulating activities within their territory.

In a nutshell, Google and Meta – two unaccountable, foreign monopolies – want to retain for themselves the right to determine what Canadians are able to access over their (monopolistic) networks. In an interview with Jesse Brown, Google gave a nice example of what this structural power looks like when wielded by Google, with Google head of communication Lauren Skelly noting that they would be blocking Canadian sites based not on whether a company had registered with the CRTC, but on “Google’s own determination.”

This should be old hat by now, but it bears repeating: This is what platforms/macrointermediaries do. They set rules governing our actions. All else being equal, they will go along with things (voluntary codes of conduct, captive oversight boards) that don’t challenge their structural power, and resist any attempts by governments to adopt rules that they don’t agree with.

That this is a battle for structural power also clarifies that regardless of the pros and cons of Bill C-18 or any imagined alternative, these companies would have actively resisted pretty much any Canadian legislation that directly challenged their business model, which is based on low/no-cost access to material produced by others. Lots of people have been calling for effective regulation of platforms/macrointermediaries; that is, regulation that changes their behaviour. Any effective regulation would have triggered this type of tantrum.

2. “Value” is a two-way street. One of the ways to see Bill C-18 is as a long-needed corrective to the idea that openness itself is an unmitigated good, rather than as a two- or many-sided relationship in which all parties contribute something necessary for the creation of social value. The idea of a “link tax” as a pejorative captures the dynamics of the “unmitigated good” position: not only that the companies shouldn’t have to pay for linking to material they didn’t create, but that such a tax would serve as an unjustifiable restriction on the spread of knowledge. (Not true: As Paris Marx has noted, requirements elsewhere that search engines pay for use has failed to “break the internet.”)

While perhaps defensible in the early 2000s, the spread of misinformation and hate speech has shown the unmitigated good position to be near-sighted and naïve, while the collapse of the journalism industry serves as a reminder that the quality of content matters as much as the ability to share content. By requiring a form of revenue sharing between macrointermediaries and essential information sources, Bill C-18 can be seen as an attempt to recognize the two-way nature of the information-creation and -dissemination relationship.

(To be clear, Bill C-18 does not enact a tax (a word that has a specific meaning) on links. The use of the phrase “link tax” by people in this debate is wholly polemical and, IMO, should be avoided by those interested in serious debate.)

3. Before you judge the law too harshly, think through the politics. Even those who support the idea of government regulation have complained that Bill C-18 is a sop to Canada’s other media monopolists that misses a lot at the heart of the crisis in Canadian media. Which, fair enough. (Dwayne Winseck’s analysis of the pros and cons of the bill holds up pretty well even after a year.)

But then I started thinking about why the government may have chosen this approach rather than either a wholesale reform of the broader media sector or more fundamental regulation challenging the macrointermediary for-profit business model that lies at the heart of the problem. (Granted, this is a government that does not explain well even its good ideas, so I’m inferring here.) And when you think through the politics of the situation, Bill C-18 makes a lot more sense; i.e., it’s not a completely bananaheaded law.

First off, tackling foreign macrointermediaries/platforms (in C-11, C-18 and the upcoming online harms legislation) and Canada’s homegrown media monopolies would be like fighting a war on two fronts. To suggest it is to immediately see its folly.

Second, and related, the reality is that controversial legislation needs allies. Rupert Murdoch and his poisonous empire rightly deserve all our scorn. But the reality is, Australia’s legislation doesn’t get anywhere without the backing of a powerful lobby, which in their case was Murdoch. In Canada, it’s the large media companies. Communication and law professors may have right, and an armada of Twitter followers, on their side, but that’s not nearly enough to push through an ambitious policy agenda. You go to policy war with the allies you have.

Third, Canada, like Australia, is a small player. One of the lessons of Natasha Tusikov’s invaluable book, Chokepoints: Global Private Regulation on the Internet, is that the power to shape the actions of these large macrointermediaries is largely the purview of the biggest states, namely the United States and the European Union. The European Union’s market power allows it to reshape these companies’ activities — that is, they can exert structural power over Meta and Google.

Not so smaller countries. I’m not sure that Canada or Australia could pull off more than they have here. And that they’re even trying to hold these titans accountable is laudable enough that we should try to understand their logic, even if in the case of Canada (as noted), they may not be as forthcoming as they should be.

If negotiating a multi-million-dollar payment among media players is anathema to these companies, imagine their reaction if Canada, or Australia, had tried to, as Cory Doctorow recommends, crack down on the surveillance-based advertising that is their lifeblood. I 100% agree this needs to happen, and even that it would be worth the sacrifice. But there’s no world in which it wouldn’t trigger a nuclear reaction from our macrointermediary overlords.

The best should not be the enemy of the good. These companies need to be subject to democratic domestic regulation. A plan that leaves platform power relatively intact while leaving it to private actors to negotiate payments? I totally get it. Does it solve all our problems? No. Did it do enough? Not at all — Paris Marx has a nice rundown of things that the government should also be doing, while Winseck’s piece, cited above, lays out a policy agenda I find hard to disagree with. But: it gets some money to media companies while trying not to pick too big a fight. In other words, it wasn’t a crazy idea, no matter what the Monday-morning quarterbacks are saying.

4. Remember net neutrality? I’m still waiting for someone to stand up for the principle that online service providers should not discriminate against different types of content. To wit: following the principle of net neutrality, it should be illegal for search engines and social media platforms to discriminate against Canadian news providers. This should be part of the government’s next move, in Sandy Garossino’s words, to “Hit. Them. Harder.” This is about structural power. Canada needs to ensure the health of its information ecosystem: this is an existential requirement. Right now, Meta and Google are threatening its health.

5. This is just a preview of what’s to come. I still find it hard to believe that these companies, and their hangers-on, are fighting so hard against what are, in the big picture, very minor pieces of legislation. Countries need a healthy information ecosystem to survive: that content-dissemination companies, whose own behaviours have been degrading said ecosystem, should pay to support that should be a no-brainer. Ditto payments to support Canadian culture, which have been a normal part of Canadian society for decades.

As for the fear-mongering over requiring these companies to promote Canadian culture in their search results? Pass me my smelling salts! I’d be a lot more concerned if these companies didn’t already shape their search and recommendation algorithms to suit their own commercial interests, and if the government were asking for anything more than what has been common practice, again, for decades.

The real fight is still on the horizon. The regulation of online harms is going to be bruising. And while it touches any number of third rails, especially free expression, thinking about it as a contest over structural power – whether democratic governments or unaccountable foreign corporations should set the rules under which we live – can help clarify things.

As Facebook and Google’s attempts to hold Canadian media and Canadians hostage against the Canadian government show, these companies already – and vengefully – restrict freedom of expression on their platform. The question before us isn’t, should expression be restricted online? It already and always is. And even the question of what the rules should be is, in a sense, secondary to the larger issue of, who should be allowed to set them, and with what degree of accountability? From where I sit, the Canadian government is a hell of a lot more accountable, and responsible, than these two would-be information monopolists.

That’s enough for me. I’m going to write a post for the release of our book (out next week! DO NOT BUY THE EBOOK – it’ll be available as an Open Access publication), but other than that I’ll see y’all in a couple of months. Don’t drop any heavy legislation while I’m AFK.

Here’s a picture of Niagara Falls, which isn’t a metaphor for anything. It’s just pretty, and pretty majestic.

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